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REINING IN THE PARENTAL-DISCIPLINE 
DEFENSE:  ADDRESSING THE NEED FOR 
STANDARDS THAT WORK TO PROTECT 
INDIANA’S CHILDREN 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As ten-year-old William sits in his chair at school, he finds it difficult 
to concentrate on the words the teacher is writing on the board.  William 
continuously shifts from side to side, putting weight on the right side of 
his thigh and then on his left.  He teeters on the edge of the chair.  He 
dare not completely sit down because the pain would be too much to 
handle.  His teacher, Mrs. Smith, notices that William is not taking notes 
like everyone else and has been inattentive all day long.  Before recess, 
Mrs. Smith asks William to meet with her.  William explains that he 
cannot sit in his chair because of the pain.  He hurts because last night 
his mother spanked him twelve times with an electrical cord for lying to 
her.  Alarmed, Mrs. Smith takes William to the guidance counselor, who 
calls Child Protective Services.  Child Protective Services interviews 
William and his family.  His mother states that she has tried grounding 
William but cannot get through to him, so spanking him with a cord was 
the only way to discipline him.  She is tired of William’s continual 
misbehavior and cannot take it any longer.  Ultimately, Child Protective 
Services determines that William is no longer safe to remain with his 
mother.  William is removed from his home, placed in foster care, and 
forced to meet with several strangers known as case workers and 
therapists.  Eventually, William’s mother is charged with battery, but is 
later exonerated on criminal charges.  She is set free because her purpose 
for beating William was to punish him for his history of trouble-making 
and to deter him from doing it again.  While William’s mother’s criminal 
trial was going on, William’s father filed for custody modification, and 
the court ordered William to move hundreds of miles away from his 
family and friends to a place he has never lived in order to ensure his 
safety.1  All of this raises the question of who pays for child abuse—the 
parent or the child? The parental-discipline defense is used to justify a 
parent’s battery against a child when the parent has participated in 
reasonable discipline of the child.2  Without the defense, a parent may be 
                                                 
1 Facts are loosely based upon the circumstances surrounding Willis v. Indiana, 888 
N.E.2d 170 (Ind. 2008). 
2 See Deana Pollard, Banning Child Corporal Punishment, 77 TUL. L. REV. 575, 634–35 
(2003) (arguing for a ban on corporal punishment because of its negative impact on 
children and, in turn, society).  Pollard notes that the United States uses violence against 
children more than any other industrialized nation.  Id. at 577.  Pollard advocates banning 
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subject to civil and criminal liability for battery, including other 
repercussions such as removal of the child from the home, protective 
orders, and custody orders.3  A parent, however, may escape civil and 
criminal liability if he or she successfully raises the parental-discipline 
defense.4  Every state allows corporal punishment in some form, and 
almost thirty states have codified the parental-discipline defense.5  The 
                                                                                                             
corporal punishment in the United States because of its negative impact on children, 
parents, and society.  Id. at 577–78.  She states that corporal punishment increases a “child’s 
aggression level, decrease[s] [his or her] cognitive functioning, and increase[s] 
psychological and physical ailments.”  Id. at 577.  For parents, it increases guilt and 
deteriorates the parent-child bond.  Id. at 577–78.  Pollard notes that child abuse 
jurisprudence is parent-centered, and she recommends a change to a child-centered 
approach.  Id. at 645–46.  Furthermore, she wishes to raise awareness that corporal 
punishment, even in the absence of physical injury, can cause emotional harm.  Id. at 648–
50.  See generally infra note 91 (providing the Model Penal Code’s model legislation to the 
parental-discipline defense); infra note 115 (providing the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ 
factors for a court to consider when determining whether a parent’s conduct is justified).  
The American Academy of Pediatrics (“AAP”) defines corporal punishment as the 
application of force so as to cause physical pain in response to an undesirable behavior.  
Comm. on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family Health, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, 
Guidance for Effective Discipline, 101 PEDIATRICS 723, 725 (1998).  The AAP recommends that 
parents use forms of discipline other than physical discipline.  Id. at 726.  The AAP 
promotes this viewpoint because of the danger to health that corporal punishment creates 
and lack of efficacy corporal punishment has compared to using other strategies, such as 
time-out or removal of privileges.  Id. 
3 Jennifer A. Brobst, The Parental Discipline Defense in New Zealand:  The Potential Impact 
of Reform in Civil Proceedings, 27 N.C. CENT. L.J. 178, 178–79 (2005).  Brobst makes a 
comparative analysis of the parental-discipline defense across countries.  Id. at 178–82.  In 
the United States, parents who participate in physical punishment of their child that fits the 
statutory definition of abuse may be subject to civil and criminal liability.  Id. at 179–80.  
The parental-discipline defense is a full justification defense available in every state.  Id.  
Thus, if a person is successful in raising the defense, he or she will be exonerated.  Id. at 
180; 1 JOHN E.B. MYERS, MYERS ON EVIDENCE IN CHILD, DOMESTIC, AND ELDER ABUSE CASES 
210–11, 301–02 (2005) (describing the use of the parental-discipline defense); 2 PAUL H. 
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 144 (1984), available at 2 CRLDEF § 144 (West, 
Westlaw Current through 2009 Update) (discussing the parental-discipline defense as 
applied throughout the United States). 
4 See MYERS, supra note 3, at 210, 216 (stating that American law allows parents to raise 
the defense that they were engaging in reasonable corporal punishment).  Myers provides a 
treatise on child abuse that provides an in-depth perspective on how the legal system deals 
with child abuse.  Id.  See also ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 144 (stating that the parent’s actions 
will be justified even though the force is otherwise unlawful). 
5 See Pollard, supra note 2, at 577 (discussing that American law protects parents who 
use physical violence against a child in all fifty states); Common Law Approaches and 
Statutes, infra notes 19–20 (illustrating the variety of approaches to the parental-discipline 
defense in the United States).  Pollard goes onto contrast this phenomenon with what is 
going on elsewhere in the world.  Id. at 587–92.  She noted that Sweden, Finland, Austria, 
Norway, Cyprus, Croatia, Denmark, and Latvia have banned corporal punishment via 
legislative action, while Italy outlawed it via court order.  Id. at 589–91.  Pollard noted that 
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defense is justified by its ability to preserve a parent’s right to the 
upbringing of his or her child as a means to promote good citizenry and 
family harmony.6  Research, however, contradicts this belief by 
suggusting that physical discipline undermines the goals of good 
citizenship and family harmony.7  Children who are physically 
disciplined are more likely to suffer from depression, anxiety, and fear.8  
In addition, they are less likely to comply with authority over a long-
term period of time.9  Finally, the use of physical force negatively 
impacts the parent-child bond.10  Such research erodes the principle 
justification for the parental-discipline defense.11   Nevertheless, despite 
                                                                                                             
the European Court of Human Rights effectively banned physical punishment in the 
United Kingdom.  Id. at 590–91. 
6 See infra Part II.B (discussing the rationale the courts have provided for the parental-
discipline defense, including the need to promote morality and family harmony). 
7 See infra Part II.D (illustrating that corporal punishment does not promote family 
harmony or moral behavior, but instead negatively affects the growth and development of 
the child and parent-child bond). 
8 MURRAY A. STRAUS, BEATING THE DEVIL OUT OF THEM:  CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICAN FAMILIES 165–66 (1994).  The author also notes other social problems children 
experience when corporal punishment is used, such as the person is likely to hit other 
children and adults, to experience less rapid cognitive development, to be suicidal, to be 
violent towards their children or spouse, to engage in other violent behaviors, to develop a 
drinking problem, to receive a lower occupation and income, and to participate in 
masochistic sexual conduct.  Id.  Compare id., with Judith G. McMullen, “You Can’t Make 
Me!”:  How Expectations of Parental Control over Adolescents Influence the Law, 35 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 603, 604–05 (2004).  Judith McMullen advocates punishing parents for their children’s 
misbehavior for three reasons:  doing so makes parents more attune and accountable for 
taking constructive action to affect their children’s behavior, constitutes a kind of 
retribution against those persons perceived as responsible for a generation, and may serve 
as a deterrent to recalcitrant children who take advantage of lenient parenting.  Id. 
9 STRAUS, supra note 8, at 153.  The author states: 
Hitting a child to stop misbehavior may be the easy way in the short 
run, but in the slightly longer run, it makes the job of being a parent 
more difficult.  This is because spanking reduces the ability of parents 
to influence their children, especially in adolescence when they are too 
big to control by physical force.  Children are more likely to do what 
the parents want if there is a strong bond of affection with the parent.  
In short, being able to influence a child depends in considerable part 
on the bond between parent and child. 
Id. 
10 Murray A. Straus, Children Should Never, Ever, Be Spanked No Matter What the 
Circumstances, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 137, 146 (Donileen R. 
Loseke, Richard J. Gelles & Mary M. Cavanaugh eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
11 See Part II.D (discussing the negative impact of corporal punishment on children).  
Compare Robert E. Larzelere, A Review of the Outcomes of Parental Use of Nonabusive or 
Customary Physical Punishment, 98 PEDIATRICS 824–28 (1996) (theorizing that corporal 
punishment studies are not conclusive and that banning corporal punishment would be 
irresponsible until we know more about the impact of corporal punishment on children).  
Larzelere updated his research in 2000 and found that overly frequent use of physical 
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research suggesting that corporal punishment harms children, the 
parental-discipline defense continues to exist.12  Erasing the presumption 
that parental discipline seeks to promote or protect a child’s welfare 
would better facilitate a discussion as to whether a justification defense is 
appropriate.13  This Note discusses how Indiana’s current law prioritizes 
parental rights over children’s rights and advocates that the parental-
discipline defense should be modified to require a prohibition of child 
abuse and a showing of necessity and proportionality in order to better 
protect children.14 
Part II of this Note addresses the historical and cultural occurrences 
that led to the formation of the parental-discipline defense.15  Part III 
analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches taken by states 
based on their use of the Model Penal Code or the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts.16  Part IV suggests that the current approach to the parental-
discipline defense fails to adequately protect children; therefore, the legal 
                                                                                                             
punishment had detrimental outcomes.  Robert E. Larzelere, Child Outcomes of Nonabusive 
and Customary Physical Punishment by Parents:  An Updated Literature Review, 3 CLINICAL 
CHILD & FAM. PSYCHOL. REV. 199 (2000). 
12 Patricia E. Weidler, Parental Physical Discipline in Maine and New Hampshire:  An 
Analysis of Two States’ Approaches to Protecting Children from Parental Violence, 3 WHITTIER J. 
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 77, 86–88 (2003).  Four primary reasons support the existence of the 
defense:  (i) religious beliefs; (ii) the social history of people who were spanked and spank 
their own children; (iii) a legal presumption that a parent disciplines in order to promote or 
protect a child’s welfare, and (iv) privacy rights.  Id.  But see Dan Markel, Jennifer M. 
Collins & Ethan J. Leib, Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1147, 1187–88 (discussing the reasons why states offer the parental-discipline defense and 
arguing that they should not).  Markel, Collins, and Leib state: 
Moreover, without extending benefits and immunities to the family, 
the state risks losing compliance from its citizens; some benefits may 
be necessary to establish and maintain the state’s legitimacy.  Indeed, 
while the benefits may seem inappropriate in the context of the 
criminal justice system, they might be viewed as a net benefit for 
inducing general compliance with a legal regime. 
Id. at 1188. 
13 ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 144.  Recall that a justification defense exists in order to 
excuse the actor’s conduct because the harm the actor seeks to prevent through physical 
force is of greater risk of harm to the child or to the public than the use of physical force 
itself.  Id.  See Kandice K. Johnson, Crime or Punishment:  The Parental Corporal Punishment 
Defense—Reasonable and Necessary, or Excused Abuse?, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 417–18 
(stating that the parental defense is classified as a justification defense). 
14 See infra Part IV (advocating legal reform of child abuse and criminal law in order to 
address the need to protect children from abusive parents). 
15 Infra Part II (addressing the history leading up to the creation of the parental-
discipline defense). 
16 Infra Part III (discussing the Model Penal Code § 3.08(1) and Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 150 approaches to parental-discipline defense). 
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defense should be legislatively reformed to include a definition of child 
abuse and necessity and proportionality standards.17 
II.  BACKGROUND:  THE EVOLUTION OF THE PARENTAL-DISCIPLINE DEFENSE 
In the United States, every state has some form of a parental-
discipline defense.18  Some states developed the defense through 
common law.19  Others have done so by enacting a statute.20  The 
                                                 
17 Infra Part IV (analyzing the opportunities for improving Indiana’s approach to the 
parental-discipline defense). 
18 ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 144.  Robinson discusses the parental-discipline defense and 
offers an interpretation of the Model Penal Code and Restatement (Second) of Torts 
approaches.  Id. 
19 Fletcher v. People, 52 Ill. 395, 395 (1869) (holding that wanton and needless cruelty is 
barred and requires parental authority to be exercised within the bounds of “reason and 
humanity”); Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177 (Ind. 2008) (affirming Smith v. State, 489 N.E.2d 
140 (Ind. 1986) and implementing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 standards to 
determine whether punishment was reasonable); State v. Comeaux, 319 So. 2d 897 (La. 
1975) (holding conduct is justified if it is reasonable); Moore v. State, 291 A.2d 73, 77 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1972) (holding a requirement that punishment “must not exceed that 
properly required for disciplinary purposes and must not be excessive or cruel”); In re 
Rodney C., 398 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Fam. Ct. 1977) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 150 and holding that physical force justified only so far as it is reasonably necessary to 
promote the child’s welfare or to maintain discipline, noting that this test is subjective yet 
cannot exceed bounds of reasonableness, thus adding an objective standard as well); 
Harbaugh v. Commonwealth, 167 S.E.2d 329 (Va. 1969) (holding punishment must not be 
unreasonable or excessive); State v. McDonie, 123 S.E. 405 (W. Va. 1924) (holding that the 
defense requires showing of malice by the parent); State v. Spiegel, 270 P. 1064 (Wyo. 1924) 
(holding that a parent in punishing his children must act in good faith with parental 
affection, must not exceed the bounds of moderation, and must not be cruel or merciless, 
and that any act of punishment in excess of such limits is unlawful).  See ROBINSON, supra 
note 3, § 144 (citing some of the previously-mentioned cases that implement the common 
law parental-discipline defense in each respective state). 
20 ALA. CODE § 13A-3-24(1) (LexisNexis 2005) (reasonable force when reasonably 
necessary and appropriate); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.430(a)(1) (2008) (reasonably necessary 
and appropriate to promote a child’s welfare so long as force is reasonable, appropriate, 
and non-deadly); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-403(1) (2001) (reasonable and appropriate 
force when reasonably necessary to maintain discipline); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-2-605(1) 
(2006 & Supp. 2009) (may use reasonable force to the extent reasonably necessary to 
discipline or promote welfare); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-703(1)(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008) 
(may use reasonable force to the extent reasonably necessary to discipline or promote 
welfare); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-18(1) (West 2007) (may use reasonable force to the 
extent reasonably necessary to discipline or promote welfare); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 468(1) (2007) (may use reasonable and moderate force excluding:  “[t]hrowing the child, 
kicking, burning, cutting, striking with a closed fist, interfering with breathing, use of or 
threatened use of a deadly weapon, prolonged deprivation of sustenance or medication, or 
doing any other act that is likely to cause or does cause physical injury, disfigurement, 
mental distress, unnecessary degradation or substantial risk of serious physical injury or 
death”) GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(3) (2007) (may use reasonable discipline); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 703-309(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009 1st Spec. Sess.) (adopting verbatim the 
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parental-discipline defense justifies a person’s use of physical force on a 
child in order to promote the child’s welfare as long as the purpose of 
the force is to prevent or punish the child for misconduct.21  The defense 
                                                                                                             
Model Penal Code standards); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.110(1) (West 2006) (force may be 
used when promoting minor’s welfare and the force is not known to cause a substantial 
risk of death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain, or extreme mental 
distress); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:18(4) (2007) (allowing reasonable discipline); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 106(1) (2006 & Supp. 2008) (justifying a reasonable use of force to the 
extent the person reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or punish other person’s 
misconduct); MINN. STAT. § 609.06(6) (West 2009) (in exercise of lawful authority); MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 563.061(1) (West 1999) (actor must reasonably believe that the force is 
necessary to promote the child’s welfare and cannot cause death, serious physical injury, 
disfigurement, extreme pain or emotional distress); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-107 (2009) 
(may use reasonable and necessary force to restrain a child); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-
1413(1) (LexisNexis 2008) (uses the Model Penal Code but adds gross degradation); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 200.180(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:6(I) (LexisNexis 
2009) (when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or punish 
such minor’s misconduct.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-8 (West 2005) (force must be for the 
purpose and to the extent necessary to further that responsibility); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 35.10(1) (McKinney 2009) (may use physical force to the extent that he reasonably 
believes it necessary to maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of such person); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-05(1) (1997 & Supp. 2009) (may use reasonable force even if it is not 
necessary); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 643(4) (West 2002) (provided restraint or correction 
has been rendered necessary by the misconduct of such child and must be reasonable in 
manner and moderate in degree); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.205(1) (2007) (can use reasonable 
force when and to extent the person reasonably believes it is necessary to promote a child’s 
welfare); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 509(1) (West 1998) (adopts the Model Penal Code 
approach but adds no protection for gross degradation); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-18-
5 (2006) (punishment may be rendered necessary and if so the parent may engage in 
reasonable and moderate discipline); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 9.61 (Vernon 2003) 
(person engaging in reasonable discipline that they believe is reasonably necessary); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-2-401(3) (2008) (stating one may use reasonable discipline so long as it 
does not cause death, serious physical injury or serious bodily injury); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 939.45(5) (West 2005) (allowing reasonable discipline). 
21 ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 144(a) (summarizing the parental-discipline defense).  While 
this Note will not consider the use of force by teachers, many judicial decisions have 
addressed this issue.  See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (holding that corporal 
punishment used on students at school does not violate a child’s constitutional rights).  In 
Ingraham, the Court considered whether the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clauses apply to corporal punishment in school.  Id. at 659, 664–71.  Florida 
junior high students brought a claim that their constitutional rights had been violated by 
being subjected to disciplinary corporal punishment.  Id. at 653.  The Court held that 
teachers may impose reasonable force to discipline a child.  Id. at 671.  Notably, the decision 
showed a division in the Court with a 5-4 split.  Id. at 653, 683, 700.  See also Pollard, supra 
note 2, at 586.  Generally, teachers are no longer allowed to use corporal punishment to 
discipline students.  Id.  Twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have banned 
spanking in schools.  Id.  For a chart summarizing the state-by-state policies, see GLOBAL 
INITIATIVE TO END ALL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN, PROGRESS TOWARDS 
PROHIBITING ALL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN NORTH AMERICA, http://www.endcorporal 
punishment.org/pages/pdfs/charts/Chart-NorthAmerica.pdf (last visited on Sept. 25, 
2009).  For a table that provides which states allow corporal punishment in public schools 
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is available to protect or further any legally protected interest.22  The 
defense is not available to everyone, but is usually limited to a situation 
where a parent or guardian uses physical force to protect a child or to 
promote the child’s welfare.23  For an act to be justified, typically the 
conduct must be necessary to protect or further the protected interest, 
and it must cause harm that is proportional or reasonable in relation to 
the harm threatened.24  The defense is not uniform, which leads to 
inconsistent interpretation and application across state lines.25  A 
historical review of the parental-discipline defense requires 
consideration of parental rights in the civil and criminal justice systems 
as well as the increasing involvement of the government in protecting 
children.26  In order to properly understand the parental-discipline 
                                                                                                             
across the United States, see Elizabeth T. Gershoff & Susan H. Bitensky, The Case Against 
Corporal Punishment of Children:  Converging Evidence from Social Science Research and 
International Human Rights Law and Implications from U.S. Public Policy, 13 PSYCHOL., PUB. 
POL’Y, & L. 231, 258 (2007).  Similarly, commentators argue that parents should not be able 
to use physical punishment either.  See generally Tamar Ezer, A Positive Right to Protection for 
Children, 7 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2004) (discussing the need for children’s right to 
live free from abuse should trump parental rights); Pollard, supra note 2, at 49, 645–54 
(noting that corporal punishment, even when it does not lead to physical injury, causes 
emotional harm that is damaging to children, parents, and society).  Ezer promotes a 
positive right for children.  Ezer, supra, at 13.  In his work, he notes that the Deshaney case, 
discussed further in this Note, stands for the proposition that American jurisprudence has 
said that children do not have a right to protection from harm.  Id.  He supports a change in 
our laws to provide positive rights for children.  Id. at 13.  Positive rights are things that 
people may demand from their government, such as children may demand protection from 
the government.  Id. at 9.  But see Johnson, supra note 13, at 483, who believes that parents 
should be able to defend themselves so long as the child’s right to live free from abuse is 
paramount. 
22 See ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 121(a) (discussing the justification defenses’ requirement 
that the actor seek to promote a legally protected interest when he or she uses physical 
force against another).  Robinson clarifies that the primary interest is in preserving the 
unique authority of parents to rear their children.  Id. § 144(a). 
23 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 (1985) (describing the model definition of whom may 
obtain protection under the law); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 (1965) (same).  
While every state that has the defense offers it to a parent, the texts of the Model Penal 
Code and Restatement (Second) of Torts promote protection of others serving in loco 
parentis.  Id.  See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (9th ed. 2009) (defining in loco parentis as 
acting in the place of the parent). 
24 Compare ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 121(a)(2) (discussing the notion that the MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 3.08(1) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 provide for necessity and 
proportionality), with ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 144(d) (asserting that necessity is not part 
of the equation). 
25 See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 20 (providing an overview of the various statutes 
covering the parental-discipline defense). 
26 See infra Part II (providing an analysis of the parental-discipline defense as well as 
implications for child welfare). 
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defense, this Note focuses on the development of the defense.27  Part II.A 
examines the historical and cultural forces that have created the tension 
between parents’ and children’s rights in regard to corporal 
punishment.28  Part II.B discusses the common law and Model Penal 
Code approaches to the parental-discipline defense.29  Part II.C reflects 
on Indiana’s approach to the parental-discipline defense to illustrate how 
the child’s best interest is not protected.30  Part II.D discusses the 
negative impact of the parental-discipline defense on children and 
society, thus illustrating the need for legislative reform of the parental-
discipline defense.31 
A. Historical and Cultural Reasoning behind the Parental-Discipline Defense 
1. Parental Right to Use Physical Force 
It is a long-held belief that parents have broad authority to protect, 
educate, and generally raise their children as they see fit.32  The practice 
of parental control over one’s children has been recorded as far back as 
biblical times.33  In the Roman Empire,  civil law provided a father with 
                                                 
27 See infra Part II (discussing the evolution of the parental-discipline and parental 
immunity defenses and how they led to the Model Penal Code and Restatement 
approaches). 
28 See infra Part II.A (discussing the history of the parental-discipline defense). 
29 See infra Part II.B (discussing the Model Penal Code and Restatement (Second) of Torts 
positions on the parental-discipline defense). 
30 See infra Part II.C (discussing Indiana’s adoption of the Restatement standards and 
case law regarding the parental-discipline defense). 
31 See infra Part II.D (discussing studies on corporal punishment’s impact on children 
and society). 
32 See Pollard, supra note 2, at 579–80 (discussing the historical context of corporal 
punishment).  Pollard asserts that physical discipline of a child was documented in biblical 
times.  Id. at 579.  In ancient Greece, parents could sell or murder their own child.  Id. at 580.  
In English common law, a father had the right to his child’s labor and services.  Id. at 580.  
Beating children was seen as necessary to make children respectable citizens.  Id.  See also 
Howard Davidson, The Legal Aspects of Corporal Punishment in the Home:  When Does Physical 
Discipline Cross the Line to Become Child Abuse?, 17 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 18, 18 (1997) (stating 
that American law does not give the “life or death” power like the Bible); Judge Leonard P. 
Edwards, Corporal Punishment and the Legal System, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 983, 983 (1996) 
(offering a biblical verse that advocates beating a child “with the rod” in order to deliver 
“his soul from hell”); Harold G. Grasmick, Carolyn Stout Morgan & Mary Baldwin 
Kennedy, Support for Corporal Punishment in the Schools:  A Comparison of the Effects of 
Socioeconomic Status and Religion, 73 SOC. SCI. Q. 177 (1992) (discussing a study in support of 
corporal punishment and finding that those who designated themselves Protestant 
Fundamentalists supported the use of corporal punishment in schools more so than “non-
fundamentalist,” “Catholics,” or “non-affiliateds”). 
33 See Edwards, supra note 32, at 983 (discussing biblical support of corporal 
punishment); Pollard, supra note 2, at 580 (discussing biblical history advocating the use of 
corporal punishment). 
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ultimate authority over the family.34  Fathers were able to make life or 
death decisions regarding their children.35  The father could whip a 
child, sell him into slavery, and even kill him for not obeying his father’s 
commands.36  Thus, the father had the ability to determine a child’s life 
or death.37  Many have pointed to the biblical references mandating that 
parents not only care for their children, but also use physical force in 
order to discipline them.38  Similarly, American common law followed in 
the tradition of patrimonial control over children.39  Children were 
                                                 
34 See Edwards, supra note 32, at 983; Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part I:  
Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293, 295 (1972) 
(providing an overview of the history of corporal punishment, including the history of a 
Roman father’s right to make decisions about a child’s life or death). 
35 Pollard, supra note 2, at 580; Thomas, supra note 34, at 295. 
36 Markel, Collins & Leib, supra note 12, at 1190 (stating that violence in the family has 
been accepted as a form of social control); Weidler, supra note 12, at 80–82 (describing the 
history of parental authority in the United States as deeply entrenched).  Weidler compares 
New Hampshire’s and Maine’s approaches to the parental-discipline defense.  Id. at 91–106.  
She opens her piece by discussing that the Puritans enacted the first laws in the world 
limiting parental force.  Id. at 82.  Some states enacted laws in the 1800s that limited the 
lawful use of a switch to one no wider than a man’s thumb and that caused no permanent 
damage.  Id. at 82–83.  By the end of the nineteenth century, child abuse was identified as a 
social problem.  Id. at 83.  In the 1960s, legislators had to provide a parental physical 
discipline defense in order to gain enough support for child protection acts.  Id. at 84. 
37 Davidson, supra note 32, at 18. 
38 See Weidler, supra note 12, at 80–81 (drawing attention to how people have used 
religion to justify physical punishment).  Weidler discusses that some religious parents 
believe the notion of “spare the rod, and spoil the child” justifies physical discipline.  Id. at 
87.  By physically disciplining a child, a parent is aiding a child’s moral and spiritual 
development by humbling him or her.  Id. at 87.  See Johnson, supra note 13, at 415 
(providing a comparison between Old and New Testament thoughts on child-rearing).  
Johnson points out that the Old Testament promoted the use of physical force to raise one’s 
child, while the New Testament called parents to guide and educate children in the ways of 
the Lord.  Id.  See also Proverbs 22:6 (New Int’l Version).  The biblical text states different 
approaches to the upbringing of a child.  In the Old Testament, Proverbs states that it is the 
parent’s duty to train a child in the way he should go.  Id.  The text goes onto say that “[h]e 
who spares the rod hates his son, but he who loves him is careful to discipline him.”  
Proverbs 13:24 (New Int’l Version).  Compare to the New Testament which states in 
Ephesians, “[a]nd, ye fathers, provoke not your children to wrath:  but bring them up in the 
nurture and admonition of the Lord.”  Ephesians 6:4 (King James Version).  For a 
perspective on rethinking of the biblical terms, see Child Rights Information Network, 
Norway:  Church Supports Bible Rethink on Corporal Punishment, http://www.crin.org/ 
resources/infoDetail.asp?ID=16217 (last viewed on Oct. 11, 2008). 
39 LYNNE CURRY, THE DESHANEY CASE:  CHILD ABUSE, FAMILY RIGHTS, AND THE DILEMMA 
OF STATE INTERVENTION 5 (2007).  This tradition was also followed in English common law, 
yet, this rule was not previously formally adopted in England.  Weidler, supra note 12; Dale 
R. Zimmerman, Abrogation of the Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine, 12 S.D. L. REV. 364 (1967).  
Nonetheless, British common law nations have adopted the parental-discipline defense.  
Brobst, supra note 3, at 178. 
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deemed property.40  And, once again, the decision of life or death was in 
the hands of the parents.41  Puritan culture rarely sanctioned spousal or 
child abuse as it placed a premium on family preservation over 
protection of victims of physical abuse.42  Control extended so far as to 
allow parents to testify before the court in order to have a rebellious 
child put to death.43  Indeed, children did not have a right to determine 
what happened to their own bodies.44 
Meyer v. Nebraska, the first parental rights case considered by the 
United States Supreme Court, addressed the right of parents to control 
the upbringing of their children.45  While the initial challenge invalidated 
a Nebraska law involving teaching any language other than English in 
public school, Meyer supported the concept that parents have a right to 
make decisions for their children.46  In fact, the Court later ruled that 
parents have a fundamental right to control the upbringing of their 
children.47  This includes the use of corporal punishment.48  However, 
the Court has also found that this right may be limited.49 
                                                 
40 See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text (discussing a general history of the 
parental authority in ancient Rome).  See also CURRY, supra note 39, at 5.  Some legal 
scholars have argued that by treating children as property, the law has not functioned in 
the interest of children.  Id. 
41 Weidler, supra note 12, at 81–82. 
42 Markel, Collins & Leib, supra note 12, at 1192.  The authors argue that family ties 
impact judicial decisions in regards to parental control over children.  Id.  They report that 
one value of the Puritan culture was maintenance of the family unit, which led courts to 
disregard child abuse in some cases.  Id.  But see Weidler, supra note 12, at 81–82 (stating 
that the Puritans also led the movement to disallow cruel or humane treatment of children). 
43 Weidler, supra note 12, at 82. 
44 Id.  Lynne Curry acknowledges that historically several other groups of people did not 
have control over their bodies.  CURRY, supra note 39, at 88.  Slaves, for example, were 
considered chattel of their owners and enjoyed no protection for their bodies under the 
law.  Id.  Under the doctrine of covertures, women did not possess a right to make 
decisions about their bodies.  Id. 
45 262 U.S. 390 (1923).  In Meyer, a teacher taught a ten-year-old child how to read in 
German, although teaching a language other than English was illegal under Nebraska law.  
Id. at 396.  The Court found that the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
established a right for a person to raise his or her child as he or she sees fit, amongst other 
fundamental rights, such as the right to be free from bodily restraint, to marry, and to 
worship God.  Id. at 399.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 809 (3d ed. 2006) (stating that in Meyer, the Court recognized the fundamental 
right of a parent to raise children).  Furthermore, Illinois has held that a parent’s right to 
spank his or her child derived from the constitutional right to privacy.  See also In re J.P., 692 
N.E.2d 338 (Ill App. Ct. 1998) (holding Illinois constitution’s right to privacy creates the 
right to corporally discipline one’s child).  But see State v. Singleton, 705 P.2d 825 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1985) (holding that the law’s focus is on a child’s welfare, not a parent’s rights). 
46 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 809.  See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (holding that parents 
have a due process right to the upbringing of their child). 
47 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).  In Prince, Massachusetts brought a 
child labor law action against the guardian of a nine-year-old girl who was distributing 
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In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court explained that the family life is a 
private realm that the government cannot enter.50  Nevertheless, the 
Court found that public interest may necessitate regulation of the parent-
child relationship.51  The government may infringe a parent’s 
fundamental right to raise his or her child when it is necessary to protect 
a child from care or control that harms the child’s well-being.52  The 
Court further defined the outer limits of parens patriae in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, holding that the government may enter into the private realm of 
the family when a parent threatens a child’s health, well-being, or life. 
                                                                                                             
literature and soliciting voluntary contributions for Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Id. at 171.  The 
Court found that the state could regulate children engaging in selling literature because of 
the concern for children’s welfare and labor standards.  Id. at 174.  The Court held that 
parental authority is not absolute and can be restricted if it is in the best interests of the 
child.  Id.  The Court found that the child’s activity was religious, not commercial.  Id.  
Thus, the State could not infringe on her constitutional right to freedom of religion.  Id. at 
171.  The Court reasoned that there was evidence of parental control while the child was 
distributing literature, and that the activity did not harm the child’s welfare.  Id. at 174–75.  
See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (holding parents retain a dominant role in the 
decision-making of a child’s institutionalization absent abuse and neglect); Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding the rights to conceive and to raise a child are 
fundamental and custody, care, and nurturing are responsibilities of the parent that the 
state cannot provide or hinder); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972) (holding 
that parents have a right to determine a child’s upbringing).  See also CURRY, supra note 39, 
at 5 (stating that the underlying assumption of parental rights “has been that children will 
be best served when the law protects their parents’ liberties”). 
48 Edwards, supra note 32, at 983.  Edwards defined corporal punishment as “the 
intentional infliction of physical force by a parent or parent figure upon a child with the 
purpose of correcting the child’s behavior.”  Id.  Corporal punishment may be broken 
down into two forms:  excessive or improper.  Id. at 985; MYERS, supra note 3, at 211.  
Excessive punishment occurs when there is a proper purpose, but the punishment is 
perhaps unreasonable.  Edwards, supra note 32, at 985.  Improper punishment occurs when 
a parent uses physical force for an improper purpose.  MYERS, supra note 3, at 211.  
Distinguishing between the two may be difficult for some courts.  Id.  The Florida Supreme 
Court recognized that drawing the line between abuse and permissible corporal 
punishment is difficult.  Id. (citing Raford v. State, 828 So. 2d 1012, 1020–21 (Fla. 2002). 
49 See Prince, 321 U.S. at 174–75 (limiting the parental authority in the face of child’s best 
interest). 
50 Id. at 166 (relying on precedent established in Meyer, 262 U.S. 390). 
51 Id. (noting that the state may interfere with parental rights when the parent’s conduct 
is not in the child’s best interest). 
52 Id. at 174–75 (noting the court can intervene in situations where the child’s welfare is 
compromised but, in this case, the court found that religious activity was not detrimental to 
the child’s welfare).  This holding illustrates the philosophy of parens patriae, or “parent of 
his or her country[,]” which is when the government stands as the guardian of children or 
mentally impaired persons.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009). 
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2. Children’s Rights to Live Free from Abuse or Neglect 
During the nineteenth century, society began to view children as 
deserving protection from cruel and inhumane treatment.53  Courts 
limited parental rights to discipline their children by requiring that the 
punishment be reasonable.54  Some courts defined reasonable discipline 
as any form of discipline, so long as it was not cruel and inhumane.55  
Courts and legislatures, however, thwarted attempts to criminalize other 
forms of abusive parental conduct because they wanted parents to have 
legal protection to perform their parental responsibilities in the privacy 
of their homes without government intrusion.56  Nevertheless, the 
momentum building toward finding a legal right for children to live free 
from abuse and neglect continued through the judiciary.57  In re Mary 
Ellen was the first judicial acknowledgement of the right of children to 
                                                 
53 Weidler, supra note 12, at 82.  See generally ERIC A. SHELMAN & STEPHEN LAZORITZ, THE 
MARY ELLEN WILSON CHILD ABUSE CASE AND THE BEGINNING OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN 
19TH CENTURY AMERICA 213 (2005) (providing a history of children’s rights during the 
nineteenth century).  Some scholars have called for a full ban on the parental-discipline 
defense.  See MYERS, supra note 3, at 207–08 (discussing the cultural, political, and legal 
issues with a full ban on parental-discipline).  This Notewriter does not find this a 
politically practical path for most states.  Of primary concern, a ban or a repeal of the law 
would require legislative action.  Legislators represent the will of the public, and most 
Americans would not support a complete ban on corporal punishment.  Edwards, supra 
note 32, at 984.  In general, ninety-percent of parents use physical force to discipline their 
children.  Id.  But see Patricia Donovan, The Colorado Parental Rights Amendment:  How and 
Why It Failed, 29 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 187 (1997) (discussing that a proposed change to 
Colorado’s constitution to give parents the right to direct and control the discipline, 
education, and upbringing of their children was defeated by a large margin). 
54 Fletcher v. People, 52 Ill. 395 (1869).  In Fletcher, a father attempted to remove vermin 
from his blind son by covering the boy in kerosene and locking him in a damp basement 
for several days during mid-winter.  Id.  The court recognized that parents are given large 
discretion in parenting, but this discretion is limited to treatment that is reasonable and 
humane, and the law punishes parents who engage in wanton and needless cruelty.  Id.  
The court held that parents’ conduct could not be cruel or excessive, but if it was, then the 
parents would be held criminally liable.  Id.  See also Hornbeck v. State, 45 N.E. 620 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1896) (prohibiting cruel, unreasonable, or inhumane cruel treatment).  In Hornbeck, a 
father whipped his thirteen-year-old son with a buggy whip.  Id. at 620.  The court stated 
that while a parent has a right to punish a child, that punishment will not be protected if it 
is excessive, unreasonable, or cruel.  Id.  The father was found criminally liable based on the 
evidence.  Id. 
55 See Hornbeck, 45 N.E. at 620 (limiting the description of child abuse to cruel or 
inhumane treatment); State v. Jones, 95 N.C. 588 (1886) (holding that child abuse is 
treatment that is cruel or inhumane). 
56 See Weidler, supra note 12, at 80–85 (discussing the evolution of the defense). 
57 See generally SHELMAN & LAZORITZ, supra note 53 (providing a historical account of 
child abuse and neglect laws).  Through In re Mary Ellen, the case prompting the formation 
of the Cruelty Against Children Society, the authors chronicle the beginning of the child 
welfare system in New York and the United States during the mid-1800s case.  Id. 
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live free from abuse in the United States.58  The New York appellate 
court sentenced the guardians of nine-year-old Mary Ellen Wilson to one 
year in prison, plus hard labor, for physical abuse and neglect.59  This 
case, along with the social response of child protection organizations, led 
to child abuse becoming a recognized concept in U.S. law.60  Following In 
re Mary Ellen, there was a definitive tension in handling child abuse 
situations without excessive governmental encroachment into the family 
domain.61 The tension was a product of the shift in thought about 
children’s rights.62  By the 1970s, the federal government and several 
states sought to enact child protection laws under the Child Abuse 
Prevention and Treatment Act.63  However, advocating the parental right 
to use force in child discipline and the governmental desire to ensure 
child safety created tension in the law.64  In order to strike a balance, 
state legislatures enacted parental-discipline defenses with child 
protection laws to ensure passage of the child welfare reform measures.65 
                                                 
58 Id.  See Sallie A. Watkins, The Mary Ellen Myth:  Correcting Child Welfare History, 35 SOC. 
WORK 500 (1990) (discussing the history and importance of In re Mary Ellen in child 
protection).  Prior to In re Mary Ellen, cruelty to children was not recognized by New York 
law even though cruelty to animals was recognized.  American Humane, Mary Ellen 
Wilson:  How One Girl’s Plight Started the Child-Protection Movement, 
http://www.americanhumane.org/about-us/who-we-are/history/mary-ellen.html (last 
visited on Jan. 12, 2009). 
59 SHELMAN & LAZORITZ, supra note 53, at 94. 
60 Id.; American Humane, supra note 58.  The court sentenced Mary Ellen’s guardians to 
two years in jail for their neglect and abuse of her.  SHELMAN & LAZORITZ, supra note 53, at 
94. 
61 See State v. Washington, 29 So. 55 (La. 1900) (discussing that a jury did not have to rely 
upon the parent’s subjective interpretation of the events, which was a change in the law 
toward a more subjective standard of reasonableness). 
62 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ABOUT 
CAPTA:  A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1 (2004), http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/ 
about.pdf (discussing the legislative history of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment 
Act (“CAPTA”)).  CAPTA sought to fund and guide government efforts at reducing child 
abuse and neglect.  42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5106 (2006).  CAPTA defined child abuse as, “at a 
minimum, any recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results 
in death, serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation, or an act or 
failure to act which presents an imminent risk of serious harm.”  Id. § 5106(g) (emphasis 
added). 
63  CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 62, at 1. 
64 Susan Vivian Manigold, Transgressing the Border Between Protection and Empowerment 
for Domestic Violence Victims and Older Children:  Empowerment as Protection in the Foster Care 
System, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 69, 90–91 (2001) (stating that the state’s desire to provide for 
parental rights and children’s rights created a two-part system in which one may 
participate in a separate criminal and child welfare cases for the same act of child abuse).  
See Pollard, supra note 2, at 644 (discussing two separate systems used to deal with corporal 
punishment cases). 
65 See cases cited supra note 19 (providing the parental-discipline defenses available in 
common law); statutes cited supra note 20 (listing the parental-discipline defenses available 
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States slowly implemented standards that would balance child 
welfare with family autonomy.66  During this process, the law continued 
to transform in order to provide for more protection of children from 
abuse.67  For example, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the 
government will not interfere in family affairs by punishing a parent 
who has corrected his or her child unless the punishment produces 
permanent injury or is inflicted with malice.68  However, some states 
added an objective element to reduce the subjective element of the 
defense.69  A century after the initial children’s rights movement in the 
United States, the same concerns over children’s rights and the sanctity 
of the privacy of the home are being litigated in American courts.70  In 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, the Court 
considered whether children have a constitutional right to live free from 
abuse.71  The Supreme Court sidestepped the issue of children’s rights by 
                                                                                                             
in statutory form).  See also Weidler, supra note 12, at 83 (discussing the evolution of child 
protection laws).  After many states passed child protection laws, “the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed constitutional protection for parental autonomy in deciding how to raise 
children.”  Id. at 84.  See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 738 (1977) (holding that the 
Eighth Amendment does not provide a positive right from corporal punishment). 
66 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 19 (providing common law approaches to the adoption 
of a parental-discipline defense). 
67 See statutes cited supra note 20 (providing the statutes and thus illustrating that the 
statutes’ passage dates range from the mid 1950s through the 1980s). 
68 See, e.g., State v. Jones, 95 N.C. 588 (1886) (providing a ruling that malice is required 
for a parent’s conduct to be unjustified). 
69 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1) commentary (1979).  Reasonableness will be based upon 
standards articulated in state law.  Id.  The code holds that ambiguities in the evidence 
must be decided in favor of the defendant.  Id.  See supra notes 10–11. 
70 SHELMAN & LAZORITZ, supra note 53, at 213 (reflecting on the impact of In re Mary 
Ellen and discussing that states are still considering how to address child abuse whilealso 
ensuring parental rights).  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 810 (stating that following 
Parham and Yoder, there is a strong argument that the Court has undervalued the 
importance of protecting children and that it is quite willing to defer to parental decisions). 
71 489 U.S. 189 (1989).  The case of Joshua DeShaney depicts the failure of Wisconsin’s 
child welfare system to protect Joshua from continued abusive acts perpetrated by his 
father.  In DeShaney, the Court considered whether the failure of Winnebago County’s 
Department of Social Services to protect Joshua from his father violated the child’s 
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.  CURRY, supra note 39, at 3.  Joshua 
was beaten on several occasions by his father, leading to hospitalization on two occasions.  
Id. at 146.  Eventually, the child welfare system took custody of Joshua, only to give 
custody back to his father the next day after he agreed to participate in services.  Id.  
Throughout the case with the family, the social worker noted several physical injuries to 
Joshua, and on the last home visit, she did not see the child.  Id.  Joshua ended up in the 
hospital again, but this time permanently injured.  Id.  The Court held that there was no 
state action conferring liability.  Id.  See Ezer, supra note 21, at 3 (stating that the DeShaney 
holding meant that children have no right to protection even if the government is involved 
in their family). 
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finding that the Constitution only guaranteed the right of the child to 
live free from governmental harm.72 
One thing is clear—there is no constitutional right for a parent to use 
physical force on a child that reaches abusive levels.73  Some states have 
allowed courts to define whether the privilege is available, and if so, 
what standards must be met to gain protection.74  In other states, the 
legislatures have enacted statutes covering the defense.75  An 
examination of the common law and the Model Penal Code approaches 
to the parental-discipline defense reveals that the line between 
reasonable punishment and abuse is elusive because of the failure to 
define child abuse within the context of the criminal case for physical 
abuse on a minor.76  But as more research highlights the negative impact 
of corporal punishment, scholars and child advocates are calling for a 
reform in law and practice to make the rule either more clear or to ban it 
in its entirety.77 
B. Legal Responses to the Parental-Discipline Defense:  The Model Penal Code 
and Restatement (Second) of Torts Approaches to the Parental-Discipline 
Defense 
The parental-discipline defense has a varied history among the 
states.78  In some states, the court and/or legislature adopted the 
common law approach while others have adopted some form of the 
Model Penal Code.79  All states recognize a parent’s right to use corporal 
                                                 
72 CURRY, supra note 39, at 146.  The negative right the government provides is simply 
the right to be free from government harm to a child.  Id.  Furthermore, critics believe that 
the result of DeShaney is greater protection for social workers than for children.  See 
generally id. at 140–44 (discussing that the DeShaney decision helps other parties more than 
children). 
73 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1971) (limiting parental authority to actions that 
do not harm a child’s welfare). 
74 See cases cited supra note 19. 
75 See statutes cited supra note 20. 
76 MYERS, supra note 3, at 211.  Myers discusses the elusiveness of the line between abuse 
and punishment.  Id.  See also Brobst, supra note 3, at 179 (noting how courts have had 
difficulty in obtaining a consistent approach to child abuse when they must interpret the 
reasonableness of the use of force). 
77 See infra Part II.B (discussing the negative impact on children of corporal punishment). 
78 See supra notes 19–20 (providing the statutory and common law approaches to the 
parental-discipline defense). 
79 Id.  See ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 144 (showing the approaches taken by different 
states to address the parental-discipline defense).  See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE 
CRIMINAL LAW § 10.3 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Update) (noting that statutes differ on 
the matter of reasonableness of force to the point that there are four categories under which 
most statutes fall:  force must be reasonable, force must be reasonable and necessary, force 
must be reasonable and appropriate, or force must be something other than deadly force). 
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punishment in the home, but not all states recognize the parental-
discipline defense.80 
The parental-discipline defense is one type of justification defense.81  
Justification defenses are affirmative defenses that vindicate certain acts 
when performed in the course of one’s duty.82  While the harm created 
by the actor is illegal, his conduct may be justified because the 
circumstances of the situation are such that acting illegally prevents a 
greater public harm.83  Thus, competing interests are weighed by the 
fact-finder to determine whether the defendant’s conduct was 
vindicated.84 
The parental-discipline defense justifies the use of physical force by a 
parent on one’s child in order to promote the child’s safety or well-
being.85  The defense is typically limited to parents or those acting in loco 
parentis.86  The defense may be raised by a parent who uses physical 
force against a child under the age of eighteen.87  Most, but not all, laws 
require that the force is used to promote a child’s welfare.88  In absence of 
this defense, the parent’s conduct would be statutory battery.89  Most 
states recognize these general principles; therefore, the difference among 
                                                 
80 See supra notes 19–20 (providing statutory and common law recognition of parental 
right to use force).  Some argue that Minnesota does not recognize a right to corporal 
punishment.  GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO END ALL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN, supra 
note 21.  Jennifer Brobst notes that it is the trend in Europe to prohibit corporal 
punishment.  Brobst, supra note 3, at 180.  Thus far, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Austria, 
Cyprus, Italy, Denmark, Latvia, Portugal, Croatia, Germany, Israel, Belgium, Iceland, 
Ukraine, and Romania have legally prohibited corporal punishment.  Id. at 180 n.6.  See also 
GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO END ALL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN, supra note 21. 
81 Maj. Barham, Sparing the Rod:  The Parental Discipline Defense In the Military, ARMY 
LAW., Aug. 1993, at 40, 41. 
82 ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 121(a)(1).  First, there must be a triggering condition before 
an actor may act under a claim of justification.  Id. at 3–7; Barham, supra note 81, at 41.  A 
justification defense requires that the action must be necessary and proportional to the 
force.  Barham, supra note 81, at 41.  As long as these requirements are met, an actor’s 
conduct may be excused because the actor’s conduct’s benefits outweigh the harm of the 
offense.  Id. 
83 Kimberlie Young, An Examination of Parental Discipline as a Defense of Justification:  It’s 
Time for a Kindlier, Gentler Approach, 46 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 4 (1999). 
84 See id at 4–6 (illustrating the considerations a judge may have when presented with a 
parental-discipline defense that utilizes the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 150). 
85 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1) (1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 
(1965); statutes cited supra note 20. 
86 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676 (1977). 
87 See statutes cited supra note 20.  However, New Jersey allows a parent to use force 
until the age of twenty-one.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-8 (West 2005). 
88 See cases cited supra note 19; statutes cited supra note 20.  This goal is known as the 
triggering event for the parental-discipline defense.  Young, supra note 83, at 7. 
89 See Pollard, supra note 2, at 640.  See also statute cited infra note 130 (providing the 
elements of battery in Indiana). 
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states depends on the adaptation of statutory or common law practices.90  
These views are encompassed by the Model Penal Code or Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, although some states have made distinctive departures 
from these as well.91 
1. Model Penal Code 
Many states have adopted the Model Penal Code Section 3.08(1) 
standard for parental privilege.92  The provisions of Section 3.08(1) focus 
on the type of force used and the parent’s justification for the use of 
force.93  Section 3.08(1) limits the actor’s conduct to that which is not 
designed or known to create a “‘substantial risk of causing death, serious 
bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress or gross 
degradation.’”94  Furthermore, it permits parental use of force to promote 
or safeguard the welfare of a child.95 
                                                 
90 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150; statutes 
cited supra note 20. 
91 See cases cited supra note 19 (providing the common law approaches to the defense); 
statutes cited supra note 20 (providing statutory approaches to the parental-discipline 
defense).  West Virginia requires malice.  State v. McDonie, 123 S.E. 405 (W. Va. 1924). 
92 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1) (1985).  This section states: 
The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable if: 
(1) the actor is the parent or guardian or other person 
similarly responsible for the general care and 
supervision of a minor or a person acting at the request 
of such parent, guardian or other responsible person 
and: 
(a) the force is used for the purpose of 
safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the 
minor, including the prevention or punishment of 
his misconduct; and 
(b) the force used is not designed to cause or 
known to create a substantial risk of causing 
death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, 
extreme pain or mental distress or gross 
degradation. 
Id.  Furthermore, the American Law Institute’s records show that the privilege arose from 
the need of states to delicately weigh parents’ fundamental right to raise their children 
against the state’s obligation to protect children from abuse.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 
cmt. 71 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1958). 
93 Young, supra note 83, at 11.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 150. 
94 Davidson, supra note 32, at 21 (discussing and citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1)). 
95 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1)(a) (a parent may use force when it is used for the 
purpose of safeguarding or promoting a child’s welfare and this includes prevention or 
punishment of misconduct). 
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Unlike other justification defenses, the Model Penal Code does not 
require reasonableness.96  The Model Penal Code requires that the 
defendant does not knowingly use force that creates “a substantial risk 
of causing death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or 
mental distress or gross degradation.”97  The drafters of the code 
indicated that it does not demand the force to be reasonable.98 
2 Restatement (Second) of Torts Approach to Parental-Discipline 
Defense 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts position has been historically 
tracked through three civil tort cases between a parent and a child:  
Hewellette v. George, McKelvey v. McKelvey, and Roller v. Roller.99  State 
court jurisprudence created parental immunity, which was originally 
adopted to address torts between a parent and a child, as a way to 
maintain family harmony.100  The defense first appeared in 1890 in 
Mississippi.101  In Hewellette v. George, the Mississippi Supreme Court 
held that a minor child did not have the right to assert a civil liability 
claim against a parent for injuries suffered at the hands of that parent.102  
The court reasoned that a child should not be able to do so because of the 
                                                 
96 Barham, supra note 81, at 42 (discussing whether reasonableness is required). 
97 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1)(b); Barham, supra note 81, at 42. 
98 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1)(a),n(g).  Proportional and reasonable are often 
interchangeable in this context.  Id.; Young, supra note 83, at 12. 
99 Gail D. Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity:  A Doctrine In Search of Justification, 50 
FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 494–96 (1982); (providing the history of the parental-discipline 
defense); Caroline E. Johnson, A Cry for Help:  An Argument for Abrogation of the Parent-Child 
Tort Immunity Doctrine in Child Abuse and Incest Cases, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 617, 622–24 
(1993) (same).  Hollister notes that there are many articles discussing the trilogy of cases 
known for articulating the parental-discipline defense, but that the author relied upon 
those previously cited.  Hollister, supra, at 494-96.  See, e.g., Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 
(Miss. 1891); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903); Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788 
(Wash. 1905). 
100 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 (1965) (reflecting common law concerns 
represented in Hewellette, McKelvey, and Roller); Hewellette, 9 So. at 885 (holding that a child 
could not maintain an intentional tort action against a parent because of the need for family 
harmony, the role of families in developing children, and other public policy reasons); 
McKelvey, 77 S.W. at 664 (holding that a child could not maintain a tort action against a 
person standing in loco parentis); Roller, 79 P. at 788 (holding that family peace and 
harmony trumped the child’s interest in maintaining a tort action against a parent). 
101 See Hewellette, 9 So. at 885 (standing for the initial proposition that a parent could be 
immune from a tort action brought by a child).  
102 Id. at 887.  In Hewellette, a child attempted to sue her parents for the suffering she 
incurred while in an insane asylum.  Id.  The Court held that a child, and likewise parents, 
could not sue for tortious conduct because of the unique role of the members of a family.  
Id.  Namely, a child’s role to obey his or her parents and the parent’s role to protect, care 
for, and control a child prohibited such conduct.  Id. 
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need for peace and families in society, and for sound public policy 
reasons.103  By 1905, Tennessee and Washington followed Mississippi by 
creating immunity for parents in a tort action.104 
In McKelvey v. McKelvey, the Tennessee Supreme Court adhered to 
the policy of the Mississippi court and held that a child could not sustain 
a tort action against his stepmother for cruel and inhumane treatment.105  
The court noted that the stepmother had been given permission by the 
child’s father to inflict punishment upon the child.106  The court reasoned 
that, like the court in Hewellette, public policy reasons, such as family 
harmony, discouraged the child from suing his stepmother.107  McKelvey 
subsequently limited the parental immunity defense to parents or those 
acting in loco parentis.108 
In Roller v. Roller, the state of Washington confirmed the existence of 
parental immunity.109  The Washington Supreme Court, confronted with 
a tort claim by a daughter who claimed she was raped by her father, held 
that the law prohibited suits between parents and children.110  The court 
                                                 
103 Id. at 887; see James K. Brooker, Comment, A Proposed Modification of the Parental 
Immunity Doctrine, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 339, 340-41, 347 (1962) (discussing the history of parental 
immunity and the public policy reasons surrounding it, including reasoning that the 
defense promoted parental authority, family peace, and unity); Susan J. Wirt, Note, Turner 
v. Turner:  Abrogation of the Parental Immunity Doctrine, 27 S.D. L. REV. 171, 173 (1982). 
104 See McKelvey, 77 S.W. at 665 (holding that parents have immunity from a child’s tort 
claim in Tennessee); Roller, 79 P. at 789 (holding that a child cannot sue a parent for a tort 
because of the need to maintain family harmony). 
105 McKelvey, 77 S.W. at 665.  A child initiated a lawsuit against her father and stepmother 
seeking damages for cruel and inhumane treatment.  Id. at 664.  The court found that the 
claim was properly dismissed by the lower court because a father has the right control the 
upbringing of hischild.  Id. at 664–65.  These rights could only be forfeited through “gross 
misconduct.”  Id. at 664.  The court proclaimed that no court in the nation had questioned 
this rule and no such action had been maintained in the Tennessee courts.  Id. 
106 Id. at 664–65. 
107 Id. at 664.  The court continued to compare the situation to that of a husband and wife 
action for tort liability.  Id.  The court stated that a wife could not sue her husband for 
injury during covertures.  Id. at 665.  It is based upon the unity by virtue of the marriage 
relation and upon the respective rights and duties involved in that relation.  Id.  
Interestingly enough, the court also concluded that the child’s remedy would be found in 
the criminal system.  Id. 
108 Id.  Opponents of the parental-discipline defense note that the defense’s protection has 
been further limited to only parents and in rare circumstances, foster parents.  See, e.g., 
State v. West, 515 N.W.2d 484 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (providing an example of a statute that 
privileges foster parents).  Many states have chipped away at the category of those who 
may invoke the defense by excluding teachers and foster parents.  Gershoff & Bitensky, 
supra note 21, at 247. 
109 79 P. at 788.  In Roller, a fifteen-year old girl sued her father for rape.  Id.  The court 
reasoned that the welfare of the state depended on family harmony and that allowing tort 
actions between family members would work against this interest.  Id. at 789.  Thus, the 
court held that a child could not sue his or her parent.  Id. 
110 Id. at 788–89. 
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reasoned that society had an interest in maintaining domestic harmony, 
as harmonious family relations build good citizenship, which in turn 
promotes the welfare of the state.111  These three cases form the 
foundation of the states’ parental immunity defense.112  Over time, 
reasoning similar to the parental immunity doctrine was used to justify 
physical punishment in the criminal justice system.113 
In 1965, the Restatement (Second) of Torts addressed civil liability of 
parents for torts committed against their children.114  The Restatement 
stated that a parent is privileged to apply such reasonable force or to 
impose such reasonable confinement upon his or her child as he or she 
reasonably believes to be necessary for a child’s proper control, training 
or education.115  Because parents are in a unique position, charged with 
                                                 
111 Id. at 789 (holding that a daughter’s tort action against her father for rape could not 
stand). 
112 Irene Hansen Saba, Parental Immunity from Liability in Tort:  Evolution of a Doctrine in 
Tennessee, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 829, 835 (2006).  Hewellette, Roller, and McKelvey are viewed as 
the “trilogy” of cases forming the bedrock of the parental immunity defense and were 
concerned with preventing the destruction of family harmony and its subsequent effect on 
the state because the family is the basic unit through which good citizenship is sewn.  Id.  
See also Zimmerman, supra note 39, at 367.  But see Pollard, supra note 2, at 644–45 (arguing 
that our society would never allow an adult to use comparable force against another adult 
or someone else’s child, thus bringing into question the moral validity of the defense); 
Zimmerman, supra note 39, at 366 (noting that other states, such as Minnesota and New 
Hampshire, have disallowed application of the parental-immunity doctrine in civil torts 
because there should be no lesser duty owed to members of a family than there is to a 
stranger and there should be a remedy available to the victim of the tort). 
113 See Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 182 (Ind. 2008) (holding that the proper analysis for 
the parental-discipline defense must utilize the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 
factors).  Some states have allowed parent-child tort lawsuits because of the rise in 
insurance coverage for such incidents, as is the case with car accidents.  Wirt, supra note 
103, at 173.  See also Brobst, supra note 3, at 185 (noting that children appear to receive 
greater protection in civil protection order proceedings than in criminal trials where a 
parent invokes the defense).  Recently, Indiana adopted the Restatement approach.  Willis, 
888 N.E.2d at 189. 
114 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 (1965). 
115 Id. § 147 (“A parent is privileged to apply such reasonable force or to impose such 
reasonable confinement upon his child as he reasonably believes to be necessary for its 
proper control, training, or education.”).  The Restatement further outlines the factors that 
may be considered when the trier of fact is determining if a parent’s punishment of his or 
her child is reasonable, including: 
(a) whether the actor is a parent; 
(b) the age, sex, and physical and mental condition of the child; 
(c) (the nature of his offense and his apparent motive; 
(d) the influence of his example upon other children of the same 
family or group; 
(e) whether the force or confinement is reasonably necessary and 
appropriate to compel obedience to a proper command; 
(f) whether it is disproportionate to the offense, unnecessarily 
degrading, or likely to cause serious or permanent harm. 
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the responsibility to control, train, and educate a child, they are given the 
privilege to inflict physical punishment in order to reach these ends.116  
Others charged with similar responsibilities, such as teachers and foster 
parents, have also been given the privilege in some states.117 
The Restatement Commentary suggests that the punishment must be 
proportional to the character of the offense and based on the 
characteristics of the child in order for a parent to be excused for battery 
of a child.118  The Restatement considers the child’s age, sex, physical and 
mental condition, the nature of the child’s offense and his or her 
apparent motive, and the child’s influence in the family.119  Limitations 
on force are sometimes specific.120  If the actor’s response is unreasonable 
or untimely, the parent may be criminally liable for battery.121 
The Restatement Commentary also states that the actor’s conduct 
must also be reasonably necessary and appropriate to compel obedience 
to a command as well as to effect a promotion of welfare or a 
punishment for misconduct.122  Arguably, state laws utilizing the 
Restatement position neither mention the necessity requirement nor 
expressly require it.123  Furthermore, the requirement for proportionality 
                                                                                                             
Id. § 150. 
116 Id. § 150 cmt. c. 
117 Supra note 108 (discussing the extension of the privilege to foster parents and 
teachers).  See StopHitting.com, The Center for Effective Discipline, U.S.:  Corporal 
Punishment and Paddling Statistics by State and Race, 
http://www.stophitting.com/index.php?page=statesbanning (last visited on Nov. 10, 
2008) (providing statistics on which states have banned corporal punishment, states that 
permit corporal punishment, and states where corporal punishment is allowed by law, but 
banned by more than one-half of the school districts). 
118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 cmt. c.  Thus, a more severe punishment may 
be appropriate when the offense is a serious offense, when the child is a repeat offender, 
when the child persuades other children in the family to commit similar offenses, or when 
the child is older.  Id. 
119 Id. § 150. 
120 See ROBINSON, supra note 3,  §§ 121(a)(2)(B), 144(d).  See also MINN. STAT. § 626.556(2) 
(West 2009) (listing conduct that is unjustifiable). 
121 John Bourdeau, Stephen Lease, Kimberly Simmons & Eric Surrette, Discipline:  Corporal 
Punishment, 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 51 (2008).  Bourdeau, Lease, Simmons & Surrette 
provide a summary of case law about parental discipline across the United States; they 
state it must be reasonable and timely in order to be protected.  Id. at 1. 
122 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 cmt. d.  The defense is limited to 
circumstances where the goal of the parent is to either promote the child’s welfare or to 
punish the child in order to properly train or educate the child.  Id.  Unlike other 
justification defenses, the Restatement reduces the necessity requirement by stating that if 
the force is “reasonably” necessary, thus opening up the door for subjective arguments 
about reasonableness of the necessity to act.  Id. 
123 ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 144(d).  See statutes cited supra note 20 (providing statutory 
parental-discipline defenses).  Thus, parents may use force without showing necessity in 
most states.  This places much weight in the parent’s hands to determine if the triggering 
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is arguably not explicitly required within the text of the law.124  In 
addition, the necessity for proportionality does not require the parent’s 
conduct to be a lesser harm than the child’s conduct.125  While the 
comments following the Restatement note that proportionality is a sub-
factor of reasonableness, one expert argues that the courts never 
intended for proportionality to be part of the defense.126  Thus, there is 
considerable debate about whether the standards of necessity and 
proportionality can be inferred by the term reasonableness.127 
C. Indiana’s Approach to the Parental-Discipline Defense 
In Indiana, when a parent uses physical force on a child, he commits 
battery.128  Battery is defined by Indiana Code Section 35-42-2-1(a) as “a 
person who knowingly or intentionally touches another person in a 
rude, insolent, or angry manner.”129  The offense is “a Class D felony if it 
                                                                                                             
condition of the defense merited the use of force, thus reinforcing criticism that the 
parental-discipline defense is benevolent to parental rights to a fault.  See ROBINSON, supra 
note 3, § 144(d). 
124 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150.  The Restatement considers whether the 
parent’s conduct is disproportionate to the offense, unnecessarily degrading, or likely to 
cause serious or permanent harm.  Id. (emphasis added). 
125 See id. 
126 See id § 150 cmt. d (stating that a parent should not be able to claim the defense if there 
was a less severe method that could be used that would have been equally effective).  See 
generally ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 144(e)(2) (indicating that courts never intended for 
proportionality to be part of the equation because of the significant deference given to 
parents to safeguard and promote a child’s welfare). 
127 See MYERS, supra note 3 (stating that reasonableness is not provided for); Johnson, 
supra note 13, at 440–44 (stating that necessity and proportionality are not built into the 
current approaches of the Model Penal Code or the Restatement (Second) of Torts); see also 
ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 144(e)(2) (arguing that it is not clear whether reasonableness is 
built into the standard). 
128 See IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1 (2008 & Supp. 2009); infra note 129 (providing the elements 
of battery).  While a parent may be permitted to use physical force against a minor because 
of his unique role in raising a child, a parent would not be able to commit the same act on 
an adult unless he proved necessity, self-defense, or defense of property.  Johnson, supra 
note 13, at 434. 
129 IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1 .  The statute states: 
(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally touches another person 
in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits battery, a Class B 
misdemeanor.  However, the offense is: 
(1) a Class A misdemeanor if: 
(A) it results in bodily injury to any other person; 
. . . 
(2) a Class D felony if it results in bodily injury to: 
. . . 
(B) a person less than fourteen (14) years of age and is committed by a 
person at least eighteen (18) years of age; 
. . .  
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results in bodily injury to a person less than fourteen years of age and is 
committed by a person at least eighteen years of age,” or it is a class B 
felony for children over the age of fourteen.130  This conduct may be 
justified if the person has the legal authority to engage in physical 
force.131 
The legal authority to use physical force against one’s child was first 
mentioned in the commentary to the Code.132  The commentary states 
that the defense includes the use of reasonable discipline by a parent on 
a child that would normally constitute battery.133  However, it was not 
until 1986 that the Indiana Court of Appeals defined the limits of 
reasonableness for the use of the parental-discipline defense.134 In 
Smith v. State, the court confirmed that Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-1 
authorized parental discipline of a child.135  However, the court sought to 
limit the reach of this authority.136  Relying on case precedent from Hinkle 
v. State and Hornbeck v. State, the court reasoned that parental conduct 
could only be justified insofar as it was reasonable and not cruel or 
                                                                                                             
(M) a family or household member (as defined in IC 35-41-1-10.6) if the 
person who committed the offense:  (i) is at least eighteen (18) years of 
age; and (ii) committed the offense in the physical presence of a child 
less than sixteen (16) years of age, knowing that the child was present 
and might be able to see or hear the offense; 
. . .  
(3) a Class C felony if it results in serious bodily injury to any other 
person or if it is committed by means of a deadly weapon; 
(4) a Class B felony if it results in serious bodily injury to a person less 
than fourteen (14) years of age and is committed by a person at least 
eighteen (18) years of age; 
(5) a Class A felony if it results in the death of a person less than 
fourteen (14) years of age and is committed by a person at least 
eighteen (18) years of age . . . . 
Id. 
130 Id. § 35-42-2-1(a)(2)(b). 
131 Id. § 35-43-2-1. 
132 IND. CODE ANN. §  35-41-2-1 at cmt.165. 
133 Id. 
134 Smith v. State, 489 N.E.2d 140, 141 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).  In this case, the father of a 
fifteen-year-old girl beat her while she was trying to explain to him the reasons for failing 
grades on her report card.  Id.  The father pulled a belt out from a drawer, and hit the child 
on the face, ear, and arm.  Id.  The father ordered the child to disrobe, which she did.  Id.  
He then continued to beat the child with a belt on her buttocks.  Id.  Noting that she was in 
incredible pain, the child put her hands and arms on her buttocks to protect them from the 
pain, but the father continued to hit the child.  Id.  The child sustained approximately 
fifteen blows that resulted in contusions and facial lacerations.  Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. (holding that corporal punishment must be limited to reasonable and not cruel 
excessive punishment). 
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excessive.137  The court concluded that the defendant’s conduct was not 
protected because it was unreasonable and therefore beyond the 
defendant’s legal authority.138  Thus, the court recognized the existence 
of the parental-discipline defense in parent-child battery cases in 
Indiana, but confined its applicability to situations in which a parent 
uses force as a means of reasonable punishment.139 
In 2008, the Indiana Supreme Court, in Willis v. State, defined 
reasonable punishment.140  In Willis, the Indiana Supreme Court 
                                                 
137 Id. (citing Hinkle v. State, 26 N.E. 777 (Ind. 1891)); Hornbeck v. State, 45 N.E. 620 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1896); see supra note 54 (discussing limitation of parental force to that which is not 
cruel or excessive). 
138 Smith, 489 N.E.2d at 141.  The court concluded that the battery statute and the statute 
recognizing parental authority to discipline a child were not unconstitutionally vague.  Id. 
at 142.  The court stated that the law did not fail to advise the defendant about the limits of 
authorized punishment.  Id.  The court further provided that no person of ordinary 
intelligence would have had a problem  determining that the defendant’s conduct was 
excessive and not protected by parental discipline.  Id.  Similarly, in Dyson v. State, the court 
found that the statute recognizing a parent’s authority to discipline a child permits a parent 
to engage in reasonable discipline of one’s child, even if such conduct would otherwise 
constitute battery.  692 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).  The court refused to extend 
the defense to a parent who is prohibited from interacting with one’s child without 
supervision and subsequently disciplines the child outside of supervised visitation.  Id. 
139 Smith, 489 N.E.2d 140 (holding that parental-discipline defense is a valid justification 
defense and that it requires one to use reasonable and not cruel or inhumane punishment).  
See Mitchell v. State, 813 N.E.2d 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing IND. CODE. §§ 35-41-3-1, 35-
42-2-1(a)(2)(B) (2008 & Supp. 2009)); Johnson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) 
(upholding Smith v. State and discussing IND. CODE § 35-41-1-4 (bodily injury is “any 
impairment of physical condition, including physical pain”)); Dyson, 692 N.E.2d 1374 
(reaffirming the parental-discipline defense).  
140 888 N.E.2d 177, 182 (Ind. 2008).  In Willis, the Indiana Supreme Court considered 
whether the parental-discipline defense protected Sophia Willis from criminal prosecution.  
Id. at 179.  Sophia was the single mother of her eleven-year-old son who had a history of 
stealing and lying.  Id.  Her son took a bag of her clothes to school and tried to exchange 
them.  Id.  The teacher informed her of the transaction.  Id.  The mother sent her son to her 
sister’s house for two days.  Id. at 179.  When the child returned, his mother discussed the 
events with him, and she asked him to confess.  Id.  Instead, the child shifted blame.  Id.  In 
response, the mother told her son to pull down his pants and put his hands on the bed.  Id.  
He complied, and from there his mother beat him with either a belt or an extension cord.  
Id.  The implement was disputed to be a belt per the mother and an extension cord per the 
child.  Id. at 182.  She struck the child five to seven times, leaving several bruises on his 
buttocks, arms, and legs.  Id. at 179.  The child alleged that his mother was angry during the 
altercation, but the mother contended she was disappointed.  Id.  The trial court found 
Sophia Willis guilty of a Class A misdemeanor battery.  Id. at 180.  The Indiana Supreme 
Court reversed the lower court’s decision and found that Sophia benefited from the 
parental-discipline defense.  Id.  Notably, after the incident, J.J.’s father, who resides in 
Georgia, gained custody of the child.  Derrick Thomas, Woman Wants Conviction 
Overturned in Child-Whipping Case, Channel 6 News, http://www.theindychannel.com/ 
news/14060769/detail.html (last visited on Nov. 12, 2008).  Compare Smith, 489 N.E.2d 140  
(holding that a father’s act of hitting his fourteen-year-old child eleven times with an 
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considered the fine line between appropriate parental discipline of a 
child and criminal conduct.141  In its reasoning the court adopted the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 150(1) standards to guide its 
decision and hastily noted that the factors in the Restatement are not 
exhaustive.142  Nevertheless, what one might characterize as child abuse 
was found not to be criminal conduct even after applying the 
Restatement analysis.143 
The Restatement emphasizes the use of several factors to determine 
whether a parent’s force was reasonable in order to protect or promote a 
child’s welfare.144  In Indiana, the factors considered include:  the child’s 
age, the nature of the child’s offense and motive behind it, and whether 
the punishment was appropriate and reasonably necessary to compel 
obedience.145  The court held that each case should be decided on a case-
by-case basis.146  However, the Restatement factors arguably allow a 
child to be abused and a parent to be found innocent of battery.147 
                                                                                                             
extension cord, resulting in contusions and lacerations to the child, was unreasonable and 
unjustified). 
 In 2009, the Indiana Court of Appeals considered a case involving the parental-
discipline defense and thereby determined who could receive the protection of the defense.  
See McReynolds v. State, 901 N.E.2d 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that a person must 
be acting in loco parentis to use the justification defense Willis provides).  In McReynolds, 
Jason McReynolds lived in Yavonne Wasson’s home and exchanged with her childcare for 
a place to live.  Id. at 1151.  Her child, M.R., was exhibiting trouble with wetting his pants 
and in response, McReynolds spanked M.R. with a wooden clothes hanger with metal 
prongs.  Id.  M.R. was hospitalized for two days for his wounds, which still required 
bandages a week later.  Id.  McReynolds was convicted of Class B battery causing serious 
bodily injury on a child less than fourteen years of age.  Id.  McReynolds raised the 
parental-discipline defense.   Id. at 1153.  Nevertheless, the court rejected the applicability 
of this defense to his case, stating that he was not acting in loco parentis.  Id. at 1154.  The 
court further expounded that he was not acting in loco parentis because the defendant was 
not a parent of the child, did not act as a parent figure, did not participate in parenting 
decisions, and did not “‘really ask questions’” about Wasson’s parenting direction.  Id.  In 
short, he was a babysitter and could not be afforded the defense.  Id. 
141 Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 179. 
142 Id. at 182. 
143 Id. 
144 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 (1965). 
145 Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 182 (providing an overview of the parental authority factors). 
146 Id.  The court also continued to note that the defense is a complete defense just like 
self-defense.  Id.  When a defendant raises a claim of self-defense, he is required to show he 
had a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm and that the force used in response 
was based upon a reasonable belief that it was reasonable and necessary to deter the 
imminent harm.  IND. CODE  § 35-41-3-2(a) (2008); Hood v. State, 877 N.E.2d 492 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2007).  The parental-discipline defense does not require that the parent have a 
reasonable belief that the child or another would suffer future harm or that the force be 
necessary, and it is questionable as to whether it requires proportionality in every case.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 (the factors that form the basis of Indiana law).  
However, compare IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(a) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150; 
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D. Why the Excuses Should Stop:  A Look at the Negative Impact of Child 
Abuse 
In 2005, Indiana led the nation in child abuse deaths with twenty-
four out of fifty-four of those fatalities because of the use of physical 
force on a child, thus raising concern about the use of physical 
punishment on children.148  Children, and society as a whole, may be 
negatively impacted by corporal punishment.149  Four primary concerns 
arise regarding the use of corporal punishment:  (i) physical force’s 
impact on a child’s emotional and mental health development; (ii) 
physical force’s impact on a child’s socialization; (iii) physical force’s 
likelihood to lead to child abuse; and (iv) physical force’s subsequent 
impact on society.150 
The emotional and mental health of a child may be affected by the 
use of corporal punishment.151  Children subjected to corporal 
                                                                                                             
there are remarkable differences between the test for the parental-discipline defense and 
self-defense. 
147 See Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 180 (indicating that child suffered physical injury that would 
be considered abuse under guidelines of the Department of Child Services).  For guidance 
on Indiana’s definition of child abuse, see IND. CODE § 31-34-1-2 (2008) defining a child in 
need of services (“CHINS”): 
(a) A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes 
eighteen (18) years of age: 
(1) the child’s physical or mental health is seriously endangered due to 
injury by the act or omission of the child’s parent, guardian or 
custodian; and 
(2)the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that: 
 (A) the child is not receiving; and  
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.But 
see infra notes 226–27 (providing a discussion on how other states approach a definition of 
child abuse). 
148 See IND. DEP’T OF CHILD SERVS., CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT ANNUAL REPORT OF CHILD 
FATALITIES 2005, at 5 (2006), available at http://www.in.gov/dcs/files/childfatality 
reportsfy2005.pdf (providing statistics that show twenty-four fatalities occurred due to 
physical abuse); Riley Children’s Hospital, Riley’s Leads Fight Against Child Abuse, Apr. 3, 
2007, http://www.rileykids.org/misc/newsread.asp?newsid=11&arch=0 (stating that 
Indiana leads the nation in child fatalities at a rate of over one death per week). 
149 See Pollard, supra note 2, at 576–78, 602–21 (offering a wide variety of reasons corporal 
punishment negatively impacts a child’s physical, emotional, and mental health and 
comparing American violence with violence in other countries while noting that American 
culture is much more violent and tolerant of violence than European countries); Weidler, 
supra note 12, at 83 (discussing the physical and emotional impact of child abuse); Young, 
supra note 83, at 4 (stating that corporal punishment negatively impacts children and 
families). 
150 See infra notes 152–66 and accompanying text (providing the reasons why advocates 
believe corporal punishment should be banned). 
151 See infra notes 153–54, 161–63 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of abuse 
on a child’s well-being). 
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punishment are more likely to experience depression, fear, repression of 
anger, indifference to suffering, and issues with logical problem-
solving.152  Even at low rates of corporal punishment, children 
experience psychological stress, which may provoke anxiety in children 
as young as one year of age.153  These conditions can likely persist into 
adulthood.154 
Also, states protect corporal punishment under the assumption that 
parents use physical force to deter a child from asocial behaviors, such as 
stealing or lying.155  However, research indicates that physical 
punishment does not always promote positive values or behavior.156  
Physical punishment does not promote long-term compliance with 
parental orders because, instead of internalizing the reasons why the 
behavior is inappropriate, children behave in order to avoid 
punishment.157  Also, studies indicate that children learn asocial 
behaviors from exposure to physical punishment.158  Thus, the law’s 
                                                 
152 Kathryn R. Urbonya, Determining Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment:  Physical 
Force to Control and Punish Students, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 437 (2001).  
Depression may lead to other problems, such as a propensity to commit suicide, aggression 
against others, and problems in the workplace.  Id.; Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 21, at 
234–35.  See generally STRAUS, supra note 8 (discussing the psychological and social problems 
associated with child abuse). 
153 Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 21, at 239 (discussing psychological impact of corporal 
punishment). 
154 Id. (noting that psychological impact of corporal punishment extends into adulthood 
for some children). 
155 See Markel, Collins & Leib, supra note 12, at 1191 (discussing how this cultural 
assumption, validated by the Supreme Court, creates a culture of “relative indifference 
toward violence in the family, particularly against children”).  See also Gershoff & Bitensky, 
supra note 21, at 245.  Gershoff and Bitensky considered the legal and empirical evidence 
covering corporal punishment in order to determine the effectiveness of it.  Id.  Their 
research indicated that corporal punishment is ineffective discipline and can have an 
unintended negative impact on children, such as physical abuse.  Id. at 233.  They then 
discussed the United States’ position on corporal punishment and compared it to 
international law and practices.  Id.  Sweden, which has banned corporal punishment, has 
had a reduction in child assaults, and fewer youth have participated in theft, drug use, and 
drug trafficking.  Id. at 251.  The authors concluded their article by advocating universal 
and explicit bans to corporal punishment in state law.  Id. at 260. 
156 Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 21, at 239. Children who are physically disciplined are 
more likely to hit a dating partner than a person who has not been physically punished as a 
child.  Id. 
157 Id. at 234 (arguing that corporal punishment does not change a child’s behavior so as 
to enhance their compliance with rules). 
158 Pollard, supra note 2, at 602–13.  The parent-child relationship is one of the first 
relationships negatively impacted by corporal punishment.  Gershoff & Bitensky, supra 
note 21, at 239.  “Children are motivated to avoid painful experiences, and if they see their 
parents as sources of pain (as delivered via physical punishment), they will attempt to 
avoid their parents[,]which in turn will erode feelings of trust and closeness between 
parent and child.”  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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assumption that corporal punishment promotes positive values may not 
be based on accurate information.159 
In addition, what often starts as parental discipline turns into child 
abuse.160  Physical punishment can lead to physical harm to the child, 
including contusions, lacerations, and tissue damage.161  On occasion, 
parental use of physical force to discipline a child becomes excessive, 
even to the point of causing death or permanent injury to the child.162 
Besides the negative impact child abuse has on children, it also 
negatively impacts society.163  Children subjected to corporal 
punishment associate violence with loving relationships and have been 
found more likely to abuse a spouse or a child than those who did not 
experience corporal punishment.164  Furthermore, when corporal 
                                                 
159 Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 21, at 240 (noting that physical discipline leads 
children to hit others as an adult); Pollard, supra note 2, at 602–21 (arguing that corporal 
punishment leads to more violence, depression, and learning problems for children later in 
life). 
160 Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 21, at 240.  Gershoff and Bitensky state that children 
who have experienced corporal punishment are seven times more likely to undergo severe 
violence and are two times more likely to suffer an injury that requires medical attention 
than children who are not physically punished.  Id.  Gershoff and Bitensky suggest that it is 
possible that parents who do not have close relationships with their child are more likely to 
use physical punishment “out of frustration, resentment, or ill will,” although no studies 
have been conducted in this area.  Id.  See STRAUS, supra note 8, at 81–98 (asserting that 
consistent corporal punishment often leads to child abuse). 
161 Comm. on Child Abuse & Neglect, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, When Inflicted Skin Injuries 
Constitute Child Abuse, 110 PEDIATRICS 644–645 (2002), available at http://aappolicy.aa 
ppublications.org/cgi/reprint/pediatrics;110/3/644.pdf. 
162 Id.  Parents have tried to use the parental-discipline defense in a wide variety of cases, 
including homicide.  See Andy Neuman & Leslie Kaufman, Murder Case Tests Limits on 
Parents’ Right to Hit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2008, at A33, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2008/01/20/nyregion/20corporal.html?fta=y.  The article discusses Cesar Rodriguez, 
a man who was accused of murdering his seven-year-old stepdaughter, Nixzmary Brown.  
Id.  His lawyer argued that the corporal punishment law of New York was not descriptive 
enough to indicate which of Rodriguez’s forms of punishment were unlawful.  Id.  Martin 
Guggenheim, a law professor at New York University, noted that the best way to define 
what is unlawful is to say that when corporal punishment is excessive, it is impermissible.  
Id.  For an example of a statute that disallows certain parental conduct, see MINN. STAT. 
§ 626.556(2) (West 2009) (stating that certain behaviors, such as hitting with a closed fist, are 
impermissible forms of discipline). 
163 See Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 21, at 245.  See also Johnson, supra note 13, at 424 
(discussing that children subjected to corporal punishment are more likely to be aggressive 
towards others).  For an interesting discussion about the impact of corporal punishment, 
see also Ezer, supra note 21, at 19–22, who argues that the distinction between the private 
and the public realm of the family is fictional and misleading.  Ezer finds that the 
superficial distinction does not take into account how the private life of a family affects the 
public.  Id. at 22. 
164 Johnson, supra note 13, at 423–24.  Johnson advocates that the parental-discipline 
defense should be limited to circumstances only where the child does not receive physical 
injury.  Id. at 418.  She proposes a statute that defines what constitutes physical injury and 
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punishment reaches the level of child abuse or neglect, the public bears 
the cost of care and sometimes medical treatment.165  Therefore, the 
current defense should be amended to provide better protection for 
children.166  In order to propose a proper amendment, it is necessary to 
analyze the current approaches to the parental-discipline defense.167 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The Indiana Supreme Court chose a good starting point in reining in 
the parental-discipline defense by adopting the Restatement standards.  
However, issues still exist with parental-discipline law that must change 
in order to give children more protection from abuse.  Most issues stem 
from the lack of a definition of child abuse in criminal law.168  First, 
criminal law is silent on the importance of a statutory definition of child 
abuse.169  Thus, decisions are predicated upon an assumption that all 
judges share a pre-conceived definition of child abuse.170  Second, the 
discretionary factors provided in Willis fail to account for a multitude of 
other important characteristics judges should consider to determine 
whether the parent’s conduct was justified, such as proportionality and 
                                                                                                             
then explicitly disallows the use of the defense when a parent physically injures a child.  Id. 
at 471.  The proposed statute states:  “Force that does not result in physical injury may be 
used by a parent for the purpose of discipline, control, or restraint of a child, but only to the 
extent that such force does not place the child at a substantial risk of either death, serious 
physical or emotional injury, or gross degradation.”  Id. 
165 See CHING-TUNG WANG & JOHN HOLTON, PREVENT CHILD ABUSE AM., TOTAL 
ESTIMATED COST OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.preventchildabuse.org/about_us/media_releases/pcaa_pew_economic_imp
act_study_final.pdf (discussing the economic impact of child abuse and neglect in the 
United States).  A recent study by Prevent Child Abuse America, funded by the Pew 
Charitable Trust, estimates that in 2007, child abuse and neglect cost families and society 
$103.8 billion.  Id.  In 1992, Michigan pursued a study of the costs to the state and found 
that child abuse and neglect cost the state $823 million per year, while prevention programs 
cost merely $43 million.  FindCounseling.com, Child Abuse:  An Overview:  Costs to 
Society, http://www.findcounseling.com/journal/child-abuse/abuse-neglect.html (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2008) (citing a study conducted by Dr. Robert Caldwell at Michigan State 
University). 
166 See infra Part IV (proposing a new law that would restrict the use of the parental-
discipline defense). 
167 See infra Part III (analyzing the various approaches to parents’ and children’s rights). 
168 See infra Parts III.A–B (discussing the positive and negative aspects of Indiana’s 
parental-discipline defense). 
169 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the Model Penal Code and Restatement approaches and 
advocating the Restatement approach). 
170 See infra Part III.A.  
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necessity.171  Third, even when the Willis balancing test is successfully 
met, the use of such a defense expresses toleration for child abuse, which 
surely is not a desirable goal.172  Therefore, this Note examines the 
omissions and ambiguities in the law and considers the subsequent effect 
it has on families in order to determine whether the legislature can strike 
a proper balance between parental and children’s rights.173 
Part III.A compares and contrasts the Model Penal Code and 
Restatement (Second) of Torts approaches to the parental-discipline 
defense and finds that the Restatement better protects children.174  Part 
III.B analyzes how a definition of child abuse may help guide fact-finders 
to make decisions that do not excuse child abuse.175  Part III.C discusses 
how the Willis decision appears to run contrary to public policy, and 
based on this result, how the Restatement position needs to be amended 
to incorporate better standards that will encourage child protection.176 
A. The Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 150 is a Good Starting Point for 
Indiana Law on the Parental-Discipline Defense. 
The Willis court made a good decision in applying the Restatement 
standards to parental-discipline defense cases insofar as the results 
under this test often lead to greater protection of children than under the 
Model Penal Code’s approach.177  A comparison of the Model Penal 
Code and Restatement (Second) of Torts illustrates why the Restatement 
approach better protects children than the Model Penal Code. 
1. Model Penal Code 
The Model Penal Code creates a two prong test to determine when 
parental use of force on a child is protected.178  Its primary concerns are 
that the physical force is used for  “safeguarding or promoting the 
                                                 
171 See infra Part III.B (discussing the problems with Indiana’s lack of a child abuse 
definition, training for judges, and differing outcomes due to the splits that can occur in the 
civil and criminal cases). 
172 See infra Part III.C (discussing the negative consequences of the parental-discipline 
defense as it stands in Indiana). 
173 Infra Parts III.A–C (analyzing Indiana’s approach to the parental-discipline defense). 
174 Infra Part III.A (analyzing the Model Penal Code and Restatement approaches to the 
parental-discipline defense). 
175 Infra Part III.B (discussing how a definition of child abuse may reduce the 
inconsistency between civil and criminal courts). 
176 Infra Part III.C (discussing the unintended consequences of allowing the parental-
discipline defense to excuse abuse). 
177 See generally MYERS, supra note 3, at 171–72 (discussing how the Model Penal Code 
may adopt the notions of older common law, thus reducing objectivity). 
178 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1) (1985). 
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welfare of the minor” and the “force used is not designed to cause or 
known to create a substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily injury, 
disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress or gross degradation.”179  
Thus, when the state prosecutes a parent for physical abuse, the 
defendant has the burden of proving that the physical force was used for 
disciplinary purposes and that it was not designed to, or known to, 
create a substantial risk of serious bodily harm.180 
To overcome this burden, the prosecution must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that either the force was not used to promote the 
child’s welfare or the force was known to create a substantial risk of 
serious bodily harm.181  However, proving these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt is challenging because of the subjective nature of the 
parental intent to use force.182  Furthermore, the evidence that the 
prosecution must rely upon sometimes is circumstantial evidence that 
may raise doubts of factual credibility.183  This high burden of persuasion 
is difficult to meet in light of the potential evidence that can be used, 
such as minor testimony.184 
Furthermore, most states have interpreted the parental-discipline 
defense law so that there is no need for necessity or proportionality.185  
While the requirement that the conduct must promote the child’s welfare 
brings it close to necessity, the drafters of the Model Penal Code stated 
that the omission of necessity was intentional.186  The drafters recognized 
                                                 
179 Id.  Compare id. (stating that the defense does not cover acts committed that are known 
to create or likely to cause substantial bodily injury); with IND. CODE § 31-34-1-2 (2008) 
(requiring that the child’s physical or mental health beseriously endangered). 
180 MYERS, supra note 3, at 210.  Without a reasonableness element courts have found that 
parents are able to leave bruises when they have a proper parental purpose and the injury 
was unintended.  Brobst, supra note 3, at 208.  However, even intended physical force that 
results in injury, which would typically be characterized as abuse, may be protected within 
the criminal justice system.  Id. 
181 MYERS, supra note 3, at 210. 
182 Id.; see, e.g., Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 179 n.1 (Ind. 2008) (explaining that the child 
testified his mother was angry when she hit him while the mother stated that she was not 
mad). 
183 See infra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing evidentiary issues in juvenile 
cases). 
184 See Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 184 (Sullivan, J., dissenting) (voicing dissent because the 
evidentiary standard is very high to meet, thus making it more difficult to prosecute abuse 
cases). 
185 ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 144(d).  Robinson notes that states either expressly provide 
that necessity is not required to gain the protection of the defense or the law does not 
mention necessity.  Id. 
186 See id § 144(d) n.27 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 cmt. 71 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 
1958)).  Namely, in criminal cases, the interest to be protected is often the parent’s 
fundamental right instead of the child’s best interest.  See Pollard, supra note 2, at 575.  It is 
the child’s interest in CHINS cases.  See IND. CODE §§ 31-34-1-1, 31-14-13-2 (2008). 
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that the basis for the defense was the belief among parents who “thought 
that [physical force] is an appropriate preventive or corrective 
measure.”187  Even a mistaken belief made in good faith would be 
protected.188  This supports the notion that the first prong is a purely 
subjective test, so overcoming this beyond a reasonable doubt is 
exceedingly difficult.189 
As for proportionality, the Model Penal Code does not expressly 
provide that the force must be proportional to the protected interest.190  
Instead, the Model Penal Code outlines forms of physical abuse that are 
not tolerated, such as serious bodily injury, death, and disfigurement.191  
Arguably, death or serious bodily injury would never be proportional to 
a child’s best interest.192  However, there are other forms of physical 
                                                 
187 See ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 144(d) n.27 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08, cmt. 71 
(Tentative Draft No. 8, 1958)). 
188 Id. at 3.  But see James Hohensee, When the Bough Breaks:  Parental Discipline Defense in 
Child Abuse Cases, ARMY LAW., Sept. 1989, at 24, 27 (“When that belief is reckless or 
negligent, the defense will fail against any offense that makes negligence or recklessness 
the standard for culpability.”). 
189 See ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 144(a).  The Indiana Rules of Evidence provide that 
everyone is competent to be a witness.  IND. EVID. R. 601.  However, prior to trial the court 
may seek special inquiry into whether a child is a competent witness.  Burrell v. State, 701 
N.E.2d 582, 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).  Even if the child at hand is competent, it does not 
mean the child will be willing to tell his or her side of the story because of fear of 
punishment.  STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK, JEOPARDY IN THE COURTROOM:  A 
SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY 263 (1995).  However, children with 
developmental differences in communication and understanding, or those who are too 
immature or sensitive to stand trial, or those children who are mentally incapable of 
recalling a series of traumatic events could arguably be competent to serve as a witness in 
trial yet not be able to produce evidence to convince someone beyond a reasonable doubt.  
See SUSAN R. HALL & BRUCE D. SALES, COURTROOM MODIFICATIONS FOR CHILD WITNESSES:  
LAW AND SCIENCE IN FORENSIC EVALUATIONS 4, 7–8 (2008) (discussing that the some child 
witnesses lose their ability to testify accurately when confronted with the perpetrator in the 
courtroom and that development issues and confrontational stress can negatively impact a 
child’s memory).  Without the oral testimony of a child, the case will rely upon 
circumstantial evidence of the abuse to disprove the parent’s motives and the extent of pain 
and suffering a child suffered at the hands of his or her parent, which may not be enough 
to convict in a criminal case.  Compare MYERS, supra note 3, at 217–18, (discussing how 
circumstantial evidence is all you need to obtain a physical abuse verdict), with Charles 
Alan Wright, Eyewitness Testimony—Reasonable Doubt and Presumption of Innocence § 500, 2A 
FED. PRAC. & PROC. CRIM. 3D § 500 (2008). (noting that beyond a reasonable doubt is the 
standard of proof for criminal convictions and is defined as “a doubt that would cause a 
prudent person to hesitate before acting in matters of importance to themselves”.   
190 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1) (1985) (showing an absence of an explicit 
requirement of proportionality). 
191 See id. (providing a list of injuries deemed unjustifiable). 
192 See ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 144(e) (discussing that deadly force and other force that 
creates extreme pain and suffering are not consistent with a child’s best interests and 
cannot be proportionate either, and therefore a justification defense is barred when the 
harm is too severe in relation to the interest to be protected); see, e.g., State v. Crouser, 911 
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discipline, such as forms of consistent discipline, that cause slight to 
moderate pain and mental suffering and that can have as much, if not 
more, of a detrimental effect on a child’s well-being.193  Yet, such 
punishment is protected under the Model Penal Code.194  The parental-
discipline defense is unlike any other justification defense inasmuch as it 
does not require that the parent’s conduct be necessary and the force 
used be proportional to the protected interest.195 
2. Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 150 
Where the Model Penal Code fails, Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Section 150 succeeds at better protecting children.  The Restatement 
provides for “reasonably necessary” conduct, and it also provides, as one 
of three options, that the punishment may not be disproportionate to the 
offense.196  In order to determine the reasonableness of the use of force, a 
court will look at several factors.197 
The Restatement provides that the punishment must be “reasonably 
necessary.”198  The Restatement accounts for the desirability of instilling 
                                                                                                             
P.2d 725, 732 (Haw. 1996) (holding that the use of force must be reasonably related to 
punishing misconduct and be “both reasonably proportional to the misconduct being 
punished and reasonably believed necessary to protect” the child’s welfare). 
193 See Pollard, supra note 2, at 618–19. 
194 Id. 
195 See Johnson, supra note 13, at 434 (discussing other affirmative defenses available in a 
battery case). 
196 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 (1965). 
197 Id. (delineating the factors a court may consider).  See Hohensee, supra note 188, at 26.  
Hohensee states the Restatement approach recognizes a limit on parental authority to 
discipline a child but does not provide specific limits.  Id.  He notes that the legislature does 
not lay down any fixed parameters to define reasonable discipline as it will depend on 
attendant circumstances and societal standards.  Id. 
198 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 cmt. c.  The Restatement states: 
The punishment which a parent, or other person charged with the 
control, training, or education of a child, has the privilege to inflict 
upon the child must be reasonably proportionate to the character of 
the offense, and to a certain degree depends upon the character or 
apparent character of the offender.  Thus a more severe punishment 
may be imposed for a serious offense, or an intentional one, than for a 
minor offense, or one resulting from a mere error of judgment or 
careless inattention.  The fact that the child has shown a tendency 
toward certain types of misconduct may justify a punishment which 
would be clearly excessive if imposed upon a first offender.  If one 
child in a family or group has shown himself to be a ringleader in 
misconduct, the necessity of correcting his mischievous tendencies in 
order that other children may not be influenced may justify a 
punishment more severe than would be permissible if there were no 
other children likely to be misled by his example.  The age and sex of 
the child may also be important.  A punishment which would not be 
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in children obedience to parental authority while also considering a 
parent’s need to compel a child to obey.199  However, the necessity 
requirement is still different than that of other justification defenses, 
which require that the harm be imminent.200  Thus, a parent can 
physically punish a child even when the harm is not absolute. 
The Restatement approach promotes proportionality.201  The trier of 
fact may consider whether the force was disproportionate in relation to 
the offensive conduct.202  Thus, if a less severe method is available, a 
parent is not privileged to use a more drastic amount of force.203  This 
may prevent parents from using physical force when other discipline 
options are available.204  However, it is problematic that the 
proportionality standard is optional as a trier of fact may also consider 
whether the force was unnecessarily degrading or likely to cause serious 
or permanent harm or injury.205  Thus, a court may allow 
                                                                                                             
too severe for a boy of twelve may be obviously excessive if imposed 
upon a child of four or five.  Likewise it may be excessive to punish a 
girl for a particular offense in a manner which would be permissible as 
a punishment for the same offense committed by a boy of the same 
age. 
Id.  See Brobst, supra note 3, at 209 (providing a Texas statute which states that necessity and 
proportionality are required in order to meet the defense criteria). 
199 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 cmt. c (delineating the factors a court may 
consider). 
200 See Barham, supra note 81, at 40 (discussing the necessity and proportionality 
requirements of the parental-discipline defense in a military court).  The Model Penal Code 
does not require necessity or even reasonable force.  Id. at 42.  Yet strict necessity requires 
that the defendant’s conduct occur to prevent imminent harm and the force used is no 
greater than what is necessary to prevent said harm.  Id. at 41.  Only then can the actor’s 
conduct be justified.  Id. 
201 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 cmt. b.  Comment b refers the reader to 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147 cmt. c, which states, “[t]he parent has the privilege 
of applying reasonable force or confinement to the child in order to control the child and 
prevent such conduct, as well as to maintain order in his household, and to train and 
educate the child.” 
202 Id. § 150.  
203 See Id. § 150 cmt. c (delineating the factors a court may consider). 
204 See Johnson, supra note 13, at 472 (suggesting that necessity standards would 
encourage other forms of discipline instead of corporal punishment). 
205 See id. (illustrating that the rule does not require the fact-finder to look at whether the 
force was disproportionate).  While the textual interpretation lends the interpretation that 
proportionality is optional, and while some courts (as will be discussed) have ignored 
proportionality in discussion, the commentary to the Restatement indicates that reasonable 
proportionality is required.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 cmt. d.  The 
commentary goes on to suggest that the reasonableness factors are predominantly used to 
determine proportionality, not necessity, but Indiana has used the standards to determine 
the reasonableness of the conduct without referring to proportionality or necessity.  Id. 
§ 150 cmt. c.; see Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 180–82 (Ind. 2008) (providing the reasoning 
for finding the mother’s conduct justified). 
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disproportionate force in situations so long as it does not cause serious or 
permanent harm or injury.206 
Arguably, this occurred in Willis where the Indiana Supreme Court 
adopted the Restatement position.207  The child had a history of defiance, 
yet the force used to punish him for stealing his mother’s clothes was a 
premeditated lashing with an electrical cord three days after the 
incident.208  The court concluded that this unusual form of punishment 
was permissible because the parent used progressive forms of discipline 
to address the problem to no avail, disciplined the child without anger, 
and did not inflict injuries constituting bodily harm.209  It appears the 
court was more concerned with giving a single parent latitude in 
disciplining an unruly child than it was in ensuring that the parent’s 
response was the lesser of two evils and in response to an imminent 
threat.210 
While the Restatement approach gets closer to a standard that 
appropriately balances child and parental rights, problems still exist.  
First, as previously mentioned, the Restatement does not require 
                                                 
206 See Johnson, supra note 13, at 417 (stating that a court will allow force as long as it is 
reasonable and moderate).  This can be problematic because bizarre punishments are 
usually indicators of risk for abuse.  IND. DEP’T OF CHILD SERVS., CHILD WELFARE MANUAL 
4.18, at 1 (2007), available at http://www.in.gov/dcs/files/4.18_Safety_Assessment.pdf 
(noting use of bizarre punishment is a caretaker risk factor the Indiana Department of 
Child Services takes into account when assessing a child’s risk for abuse).  See David 
Markland, California Faultline, Spanking Could be Banned in California, 
http://californiafaultline.wordpress.com/2008/04/15/spanking-could-be-banned-in-
california (Apr. 15, 2008) (noting that California’s Legislature considered a bill that would 
prohibit the use of foreign objects in parental discipline of children).  See also Jamie 
Satterfield, Woman Guilty of Child Abuse, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Sep. 25, 2008, 
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2008/sep/25/woman-guilty-child-abuse.  Satterfield 
cites a case that is factually similar to Willis, except that the mother was found guilty on 
criminal charges of child abuse for beating her seven-year-old son with an extension cord.  
Id.  The seven-year-old son had a history of misbehavior at school.  Id.  The mother tried 
removal of privileges to no avail and started spanking him with foreign objects.  Id.  During 
the incident that led to her criminal conviction, the mother said she only struck the child 
five times, yet the officials found the child had thirty lash marks.  Id.  Compare id., with 
Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 179 (noting that the mother had used progressive discipline against 
her unruly child only to find herself using corporal punishment as a last resort).  In Willis, 
there was a dispute between mother and child, and the child was left with bruises on his 
back, buttocks, and legs.  Id. at 183. 
207 See generally Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 183. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 183–84.  This also presents the evidentiary issue introduced in supra note 190, as 
the child said his mother was acting out of anger while the mother said she was not angry.  
Id. at 179. 
210 Id. at 183–84 (discussing the concern over J.J’s history of poor behavior and Willis’ 
struggle with it).  The court noted that Sophia Willis had struggled to parent J.J. and that it 
was sympathetic to her woeful situation.  Id. at 183. 
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necessity and proportionality as traditionally prescribed in a justification 
defense.211  Second, the Restatement factors can either help or hinder 
because they take the subjectivity out of the parental defense but allows 
for a greater amount of discretion in the fact-finder.212  Defining 
punishment by the term reasonableness leads to disparate outcomes 
because often the results depend on the fact-finder’s concept of the 
proper upbringing of a child and how to achieve it instead of a 
standardized definition of abuse.213 
B. Indiana’s Parental-Discipline Defense Law Fails to Protect Children 
because it Does Not Provide an Explicit Definition of Child Abuse to Guide 
Judicial Decisions. 
Indiana’s parental-discipline defense does not refer to a definition of 
child abuse.214  In fact, the definition in Indiana law is found under the 
Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) statute and is applicable only in 
juvenile proceedings.215  Furthermore, the language is more reflective of 
the Model Penal Code’s definition of abuse.216  Even though the purpose 
of the Restatement factors is to guide the courts in ascertaining whether a 
parent’s force was reasonable, it does not provide a clear line among 
legally acceptable physical forces.217  What does this silence mean?  On 
one hand, the law can be interpreted as intentional silence because the 
multiple factors should prevent the courts from allowing abuse while 
also protecting a parent’s constitutional right to raise a child as he or she 
                                                 
211 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 (1965) (prohibiting disproportionate force 
but not requiring that the parent’s harm be less than the child’s potential harm). 
212 See Davidson, supra note 32. 
213 Id.  (noting that the term “‘reasonable’” leaves the door open to varied interpretations 
because a court  decision will be based on varied concepts of acceptable punishment). 
214 See supra note 147 (defining child abuse in juvenile cases). 
215 IND. CODE § 31-34-1-2 (2008). 
216 See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing the similarity in language 
shared by the Model Penal Code and the CHINS Statute).  In Willis v. Indiana, the court 
recognized that the Model Penal Code approach was one that many states adopted, but 
that Indiana would not because  
the Code does not explicitly demand that the use of force be 
reasonable.  Second, under the Code, so long as a parent acts for the 
purpose of safeguarding or promoting the child's welfare (including 
the specific purpose of preventing or punishing misconduct), the 
parent is privileged in using force, unless the force creates a substantial 
risk of death or excessive injuries.  Neither of these two propositions 
finds support in Indiana's common law.   
888 N.E.2d 177, 181–82 (Ind. 2008). 
217 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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sees fit.218  On the other hand, the law can be considered purposefully 
void of a definition of child abuse, thus leaving the interpretation of 
what is child abuse to the judge’s conception of appropriate parenting or 
community standards.219  The lack of a definition of child abuse in 
criminal law has led to the contradictory result of one judge declaring a 
parent’s acts abuse and subject to state intervention, while another judge 
exonerates a parent based on a successful parental-discipline defense. 
But even if the current definition of child abuse was used in criminal 
adjudications, it would fail to give much guidance or clarification to the 
question of what constitutes child abuse.  Indiana’s definition of child 
abuse is the “minimum” definition supported by the Child Abuse 
Prevention and Treatment Act.220  Indiana’s definition provides that a 
child is a Child in Need of Services when he or she is subjected to serious 
endangerment by the act or omission of a parent and when the child is 
unlikely to receive care, treatment, or rehabilitation without intervention 
of the court.221  While Indiana’s definition of child abuse includes acts 
that threaten the child with, or create a substantial risk to the child of, 
serious harm and is more protective than requiring the simple presence 
of an injury, it nevertheless does not provide examples of what is 
considered abuse.222  In states where the statutes provide no guidance as 
to where the line between lawful corporal punishment and child abuse 
exists, one of two scenarios occurs:  the terms applied in these situations 
change according to contemporary societal standards and the conditions 
                                                 
218 See Pollard, supra note 2 and accompanying text (arguing that the protected interest in 
child abuse cases is the parent’s rights and not the children’s). 
219 See Davidson, supra note 32, at 20–22 (explaining that because some state legislatures’ 
failure to specifically define corporal punishment, state courts have been required to 
determine on a case-by-case basis whether certain forms of punishment constitute abuse). 
220 See 42 U.S.C. § 5106(g) (2006) (stating that this is the minimum definition for child 
abuse recommended by the Act).  See also IND. CODE § 31-34-1-2 (2008); supra note 147; 
(providing Indiana’s definition of a child in need of services). 
221 IND. CODE § 31-34-1-2. 
222 See J. Robert Shull, Note, Emotional and Psychological Child Abuse:  Notes on Discourse, 
History and Change, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1665 (1999) (discussing the problems inherent in 
systems that do not define abuse).  Shull stated that states offer definitions of physical 
abuse and neglect, yet legal definitions fail to capture a definition of emotional abuse.  Id. at 
1668.  However, he does not recommend creating a definition of emotional abuse.  Id. at 
1701.  A definition would simply not cover all possibilities in the future.  Id.  Illinois and 
Minnesota also have statutes that lack definitions of abuse.  Id. at 1674 n.37.  Indiana’s 
statute would not work adequately without some amendment because it requires that 
parents must not be willing or able to participate in treatment without court intervention.  
See IND. CODE § 31-34-1-2.  The statute is also geared towards directing when the State can 
take custody of a child, not towards defining child abuse.  See supra note 147 (providing the 
statutory text of the elements of abuse or neglect needed to adjudicate a child as a CHINS). 
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of the community in which the family lives or the terms are defined by 
the fact-finder.223 
Other states provide more explicit definitions of child abuse that 
could be helpful in guiding lawyers and judges.224  Idaho, for example, 
provides certain criteria to determine whether physical abuse has 
occurred.225  Iowa and Alabama have made an even broader prohibition 
by stating that any non-accidental physical injury constitutes physical 
abuse.226  Thus, it is possible for Indiana’s legislature to devise a specific 
definition of physical abuse that would reduce the variance among fact-
finders.227  The variance would be further reduced by training which, at 
this time, is neither mandatory nor made regularly available to judges.228 
                                                 
223 See Davidson, supra note 32, at 22 (discussing that the common law terms applied “to 
limit parental corporal punishment are ‘ever changing according to the ideas prevailing in 
our minds during the period and conditions in which we live’”) (citing Carpenter v. 
Commonwealth, 44 S.E.2d 419, 424 (Va. 1947)). 
224 See infra notes 225–26 and accompanying text (providing child abuse definitions from 
other states). 
225 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1602 (2009).  Idaho’s statute states: 
(1) “Abused” means any case in which a child has been the victim of: 
(a) Conduct or omission resulting in skin bruising, bleeding, 
malnutrition, burns, fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma, soft 
tissue swelling, failure to thrive or death, and such condition or death 
is not justifiably explained, or where the history given concerning such 
condition or death is at variance with the degree or type of such 
condition or death, or the circumstances indicate that such condition or 
death may not be the product of an accidental occurrence. 
Id.  See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-103 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008) (stating that physical 
abuse consists of “[a]ny case in which a child exhibits evidence of skin bruising, bleeding, 
malnutrition, failure to thrive, burns, fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma, soft tissue 
swelling, or death”); MINN. STAT. § 626.556(2)(g) (West 2009) (offering several types of 
conduct that are prohibited, such as throwing, kicking, hitting a child with a closed fist, 
and hitting a child under age one on the face).  See HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1 (1993) stating 
that physical abuse occurs: 
(1) When the child exhibits evidence of: 
(A) Substantial or multiple skin bruising or any other internal bleeding; (B) Any 
injury to skin causing substantial bleeding; (C) Malnutrition; (D) Failure to 
thrive; (E) Burn or burns; (F) Poisoning; (G) Fracture of any bone; (H) Subdural 
hematoma; (I) Soft tissue swelling; (J) Extreme pain; (K) Extreme mental distress; 
(L) Gross degradation; (M) Death. 
226 IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.68 (West 2006 & Supp. 2009) states, “‘[c]hild abuse’ or ‘abuse’ 
means:  (a) [a]ny nonaccidental physical injury, or injury that is at variance with the history 
given of it, suffered by a child as the result of the acts or omissions of a person responsible 
for the care of the child.”  ALA. CODE § 26-14-1(1) (LexisNexis 1992 & Supp. 2008) states that 
abuse means, “[h]arm or threatened harm to a child’s health or welfare . . . through 
nonaccidental physical or mental injury.” 
227 See, e.g, supra notes 225–26 (providing the ways in which other states define child 
abuse in a descriptive manner). 
228 E-mail from Jeffrey Bercovitz, Director, Juvenile and Family Law, Indiana Judicial 
Center (Dec. 12, 2008, 19:14 CST) (on file with author).  Another issue this brings up is the 
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C. Indiana’s Criminal Law Created Legal Precedent That May Have 
Unintended Consequences 
Indiana has invested several million dollars in child protection 
services, showing a strong interest in protecting youth from abuse and 
neglect.229  Furthermore, the judicial system has also sought to limit 
corporal punishment by parents against children involved with court-
                                                                                                             
divergent interests present in civil and criminal cases.  See Pollard, supra note 2, at 645–46 
(noting that parent-centered concerns dominate the criminal court system).  See also Sally F. 
Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence:  Can Law Help End the 
Abuse Without Ending the Relationship? 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487 (2008) (alluding to the 
notion that the criminal system serves to punish while the civil system serves to 
rehabilitate).  Goldfarb’s article focuses on the marginalization of intimate relationships 
when forming a protective order; she argues that these abusive relationships cannot be 
ignored in the process.  Id. at 1490.  Within this discussion, she compares the goals of the 
criminal process—protecting the public—from those of the civil process, where the 
autonomy of the individual trumps the interests of the general public.  Id. at 1542.  See also 
Davidson, supra note 32, at 23.  Davidson describes the focus of the civil and criminal 
systems as very different and states that the juvenile court system often seeks to 
rehabilitate while the criminal system seeks to punish.  Id.  Davidson suggests that in order 
for the courts to help families in child protection cases, judges, lawyers and clinicians need 
to participate in continuing education to help them better understand the cultural 
traditions of corporal punishment and how children’s misbehavior has been treated within 
the variety of cultures.  Id.; Peter Salem & Billie Lee Dunford-Jackson, Beyond Politics and 
Positions:  A Call for Collaboration Between Family Court and Domestic Violence Professionals, 59 
JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 437 (2008) (discussing the unique concerns of the family court and 
advocating for collaboration between the family courts and domestic violence advocates in 
order to address the underlying problems leading to the family’s involvement in the legal 
system); Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts:  Improvements on 
an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285 (2000) (advocating for collaborative justice 
courts, which often combine the domestic violence case with the criminal case in order to 
have a wrap-around approach to solving the underlying problems in the case).  Tsai finds 
that domestic violence law has taken a hard stance against abuse, yet is missing the mark.  
Tsai, supra, at 1291–94.  The problem is that the system needs to focus on therapeutic 
justice.  Id.  The basic principle underlying therapeutic jurisprudence is that “‘law is a social 
force that has inevitable (if unintended) consequences for the mental health and 
psychological functioning of those it affects.’”  Id. at 1295.  See also BRENDA K. UEKERT,ANN 
KEITH & TED RUBIN, THE NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, INTEGRATING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL 
MATTERS IN FAMILY COURTS:  PERFORMANCE AREAS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 31–32 (2002), 
available at http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/famct& 
CISOPTR=71.  The National Center for State Courts study sought to provide 
recommendations to increase family court performance in civil and criminal matters.  Id.  
The Center recommended that courts consolidate criminal and civil cases in order to 
promote greater consistency and efficiency.  Id. at 27. 
229 See, e.g., Matthew Van Dusen, Child Services Budget Grows by $4.1 Million, NW. IND. 
TIMES, Aug. 19, 2005, http://nwitimes.com/news/local/article_fddb35dd-7c33-59c6-84fb-
57cb28a04a81.html (stating that Porter County has, at $7.9 million, one of the smallest 
budgets for child services in the state). 
Krenson: Reining in the Parental-Discipline Defense:  Addressing the Need
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
650 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
ordered supervision.230  Thus, there appears to be a trend moving toward 
more protection for children in Indiana.231  However, the parental-
discipline defense negates those attempts when courts vindicate parents’ 
abusive acts. 
Dyson v. State illustrates the state’s desire to encourage parents to 
utilize other forms of discipline in lieu of physical discipline.232  In the 
absence of supervision, a parent who receives court-ordered, supervised 
visitation may not use physical force upon a child outside of supervised 
visitation.233  The reasonableness of any punishment outside of the 
context of a supervised visit will not be considered by the court as 
appropriate physical punishment because such conduct is strictly 
prohibited.234  Notably, physical discipline is expressly prohibited 
throughout supervised visitation agreements adhered to by service 
providers hired by the State.235  In fact, Allen County courts have gone so 
far as to order parents to refrain from physical discipline.236  This 
illustrates the state’s interest in preventing the use of physical force on 
children at times when people are subjected to court-ordered, supervised 
                                                 
230 See Dyson v. State, 692 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (noting state interest in 
protecting children); see also FAMILIES UNITED, SUPERVISED VISITATION GUIDELINES 1 (1986) 
(on file with author).  Families United, a state-contracted service provider, has set forth 
guidelines for supervised visitation supervisors explicitly stating that corporal punishment 
is disallowed during supervised visits.  Id. 
231 See Associated Press, Indianapolis Schools to Ban Spanking, THE COURIER-JOURNAL 
(Louisville), May 27, 2004, http://orig.courier-journal.com/localnews/2004/05/27in/B3-
spank0527-4169.html (discussing that the Indianapolis Public School system banned 
teachers from using corporal punishment even though it is protected by law); Mitch 
Daniels for Governor, Helping Children, http://www.mymanmitch.com/news_article. 
asp?pressid=1017 (as reported in the EVANSVILLE COURIER, Aug. 2007) (discussing Daniel’s 
support for aggressive hiring and training of caseworkers to address Indiana’s deaths of 
children by abuse or neglect). 
232 692 N.E.2d at 1376. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 1377. 
235 See, e.g., FAMILIES UNITED, supra note 230 (providing that corporal punishment is not 
allowed in supervised visitations provided by state agency-contracted service providers). 
236 In re Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of C.R. & D.R., No. 02A03-0705-JV-
218, 2007 WL 3025657 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2007) [hereinafter In re C.R. & D.R.].  The trial 
court ordered a parent to receive supervised visitation with her children for a variety of 
reasons after she did not comply with services provided through the Department of Child 
Services.  Id.  While the decision does not describe the rationale behind such an overbroad 
court order, it may be in part due to the co-occurrence of neglect and physical abuse and 
her failure to comply with services.  See id. at *1 (discussing that the family was involved 
with child protection services because of neglect but that there were also concerns that 
physical abuse may have been occurring); see also MYERS, supra note 3, at 205.  Myers argues 
that “[p]hysical abuse and neglect often occur together.”  Id.  He notes that neglect often is 
“embedded in a context of physical abuse, domestic violence, substance abuse, and 
material deprivation.”  Id. 
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visitation, even if the family’s involvement with the state is not because 
of the use of excessive force on a minor.237  Therefore, the state 
recognizes problems with granting everyone the privilege of using 
corporal punishment and has sought to reduce its use when the state has 
become involved with the family, recognizing that the practice is not 
safe.238 
Other states are starting to consider the balance between protecting 
children’s rights and parents’ rights in their constitutions.239  While 
evidence is scarce, Colorado’s citizens have prioritized children’s rights 
over parent’s rights through the defeat of the Amendment 17 
proposition, which would have amended the constitution to include 
parental rights.240  Thus, Colorado illustrates a trend away from 
recognizing a parent’s right to control his or her child’s upbringing in 
                                                 
237 See generally In re C.R. & D.R., 2007 WL 3025657.  This case illustrates the broad 
powers of courts to protect children in civil proceedings.  See id.  Furthermore, it illustrates 
that children receive more protection in civil proceedings than they do in criminal 
proceedings.  See also Brobst, supra note 3, at 185 (stating that in New Zealand children also 
receive more protection in civil proceedings than they do in criminal proceedings). 
238 See In re C.R. & D.R., 2007 WL 3025657 (illustrating that the courts may order a family 
under the supervision of Department of Child Services to refrain from using physical 
discipline).  Furthermore, there is a division within the state about the use of corporal 
punishment in schools, which has led the Indianapolis Public Schools to ban the use of 
corporal punishment.  See Associated Press, supra note 231 (discussing Indianapolis Public 
School system’s ban on corporal punishment).  Governor Mitch Daniels supports extending 
legal protection to teachers who discipline students.  See Press Release, Jane Jankowski, 
Governor Announces School Discipline Plan to Protect Teachers, (Aug. 11, 2008) 
http://www.in.gov/portal/news_events/24928.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).  The 
Governor called for more protection for teachers from frivolous lawsuits stemming from 
the use of discipline in the classroom.  Id.  While twenty-seven states prohibit corporal 
punishment in schools, Indiana still condones corporal punishment.  EducationWorld.com, 
Corporal Punishment:  Teaching Violence through Violence, http://www.educationworld. 
com/a_issues/starr/starr051.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2009); Laurie Couture, Corporal 
Punishment:  Facts about United States and International Laws, http://www.child 
advocate.org/1a_laws.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2009); StopHitting.com, supra note 117.  See 
also Urbonya, supra note 152, at 427.  Urbonya examines public schools’ use of force in the 
context of the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  She found that the Supreme Court has not 
recognized protection for children from corporal punishment in the school setting under 
the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  In her analysis, she provides a breakdown of the state laws on 
corporal punishment in the classroom.  Id. at 427–34. 
239 See, e.g., Donovan, supra note 53, at 187 (stating that the Colorado Amendment 17 
initiative failed to codify parental rights).  When the parental right to direct the upbringing, 
education, values, and discipline of a child was put up for referendum vote, it failed by 
fifty-seven percent.  Id.  One attributed reason was concern over how this would impact the 
state’s ability to remove children from abusive homes.  Id.  It also brought to the attention 
of voters the impact the amendment would have on children trying to obtain reproductive 
health care and sex education and on the burden of removing children from abusive 
homes.  Id. 
240 Id. 
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light of concern over its impact on a child’s welfare—a trend that Indiana 
should embrace.241 
In conclusion, Indiana’s current approach lacks the standards 
needed to properly weigh parents’ and children’s rights.  The standard is 
too deferential to parents by imposing a difficult burden of persuasion 
on the prosecution in order to defeat the parental-discipline defense.242  
The Restatement fails in part because of the lack of necessity and 
proportionality standards and in part because of the lack of a uniform 
definition of child abuse intertwined with the standard.243  A better way 
to approach the problem in order to protect children would be to create 
statutory language that defines the line between proper acts of parental 
authority and acts that are considered abusive.244 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
The parental-discipline defense does not strike an appropriate 
balance between child abuse and parental authority.  Instead, it creates 
an opportunity for parents to justify their misbehavior, leaving children 
to be victims of a crime that courts would not allow to occur to a 
stranger.  The discretionary factors need to be defined and expanded to 
include necessity and proportionality in order to reduce the likelihood 
that abusive behavior will be excused.245  While the Restatement 
approach adopted in Willis comes closer to protecting children, it lacks 
definitional aspects that, if codified into the standards, would better 
protect children.246 
In light of psychological research supporting the negative impact 
corporal punishment has on children, corporal punishment’s possible 
risk of abuse, and the potential for incongruent results in child abuse 
adjudications, it is time for Indiana to reform its parental-discipline 
defense.247  Indiana should redefine child abuse in its statutory language 
                                                 
241 Id.  The article focuses on the campaign’s pressure on voters to oppose the 
amendment, noting that it brought to the attention of voters the impact the amendment 
would have on children trying to obtain reproductive health care and sex education and on 
the burden of removing children from abusive homes.  Id. 
242 See supra Part III.A (analyzing the Restatement approach to the parental-discipline 
defense). 
243 See supra Parts III.A–B (analyzing the parental-discipline defense’s many approaches 
and the problems Indiana faces with its defense). 
244 UEKERT, KEITH & RUBIN, supra note 228, at 31–32. 
245 Supra Part III.A.2 (analyzing how the Restatement does not require necessity and 
proportionality); see infra Part IV.B (proposing the addition of proportionality and necessity 
standards). 
246 See supra Part III.B (analyzing Indiana’s current definition of child abuse). 
247 See supra Parts III.A–B (analyzing the impact of parental discipline on children and the 
courts). 
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in order to give concrete examples of impermissible abuse.  This 
definition should then be coupled with the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Section 150 factors.248  These factors should be reformed so that a fact-
finder must look at the totality of the circumstances, including the child 
and his or her behavior and the behavior of the caregiver. 
This Note contributes a new statutory definition to guide the 
parental-discipline defense.249  Part IV.A provides a new definition of 
child abuse that better provides examples of unlawful abuse.250  Part IV.B 
provides a requirement that a parent’s actions be necessary and 
proportional.251  Part IV.C proposes a model statute.252  Part IV.D 
discusses the effect this statute may have on society and its children.253 
A. Redefining Child Abuse  
The first initiative the legislature should undertake is redefining 
child abuse.  As previously mentioned, the definition of child abuse is a 
minimal definition.254  An expansion of the definition to cover types of 
prohibited conduct or injuries would lead to better protection of 
children.  The proposed definition of child abuse, influenced by states 
such as Idaho, Iowa, and Alabama, is: 
Child abuse is any non-accidental act or omission by a parent 
or guardian that causes or threatens to cause substantial 
bodily harm, which includes any case in which a child has 
been the victim of skin bruising, bleeding, malnutrition, 
burns, fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma, soft tissue 
swelling, failure to thrive, or death, and such condition or 
death is not justifiably explained (portions omitted).255 
                                                 
248 See supra note 115 (providing the text of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150). 
249 See infra Parts IV.A–D (advocating a parental-discipline statute). 
250 See infra Part IV.A (providing a new definition of child abuse). 
251 See infra Part IV.B (adding necessity and proportionality to the text of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 150). 
252 See infra Part IV.C (proposing a model statute that incorporates a definition of child 
abuse, necessity and proportionality standards, and parental risk factors). 
253 See infra Part IV.D (discussing the impact of the proposed statute on society and 
children). 
254 42 U.S.C. § 5106(g) (2006) (stating this definition is the minimum definition for child 
abuse recommended by the Act). 
255 The proposed amendments are italicized and are a compilation of statutory code from 
Alabama’s, Idaho’s, Iowa’s, and Colorado’s definitions of child abuse.  See supra notes 225–
26 and accompanying text (providing Alabama’s, Idaho’s, Iowa’s, and Colorado’s 
definitions of child abuse). 
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Commentary 
This proposed definition bases its characterization of abuse on 
injuries.256  A parent who causes these types of injuries to a child is 
unjustified in his or her behavior unless it is found to be necessary under 
the circumstances.257  The definition provides a uniform and consistent 
approach to defining abuse as it does not try to pinpoint all different 
types of conduct that can be considered abusive, but instead defines the 
abuse by the potential outcomes.258  This definition will provide 
guidelines for criminal law judges, who may lack experience in juvenile 
cases, to determine whether the parent’s act was abuse. 
Of course, one can see the possibility of a situation in which a parent 
acts to prevent physical harm to his child, yet causes him or her physical 
injury.  Should the parent be accused of child abuse?  Society must 
consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the parent’s action 
in order to determine whether the conduct is justified.259 
B. Standards That Require Necessity and Proportionality 
Parents should not be able to physically discipline their children 
freely, primarily because doing so has a negative impact on a child’s 
physical and mental well-being.260  Also, such physical discipline should 
not be allowed because of the costs to society when physical force goes 
too far.261  A parent’s conduct should only be justified when physical 
force is necessary to control a child who is a danger to himself or 
                                                 
256 See supra Part IV.A (providing a proposed definition of child abuse); see also Shull, 
supra note 222, at 1700–01 (proposing that a definition based on conduct would not cover 
the gamut of possible bizarre punishments in which a parent may engage). 
257 See Shull, supra note 222, at 1700–01.  Shull states that by defining things through 
conduct society restricts the law’s fluidity in time, and that instead of predicting all of the 
different ways a parent could abuse a child, society should leave room for interpretation in 
(emotional) abuse definitions.  Id. at 1701.  See infra Part IV.B (advocating a necessity 
requirement). 
258 See Shull, supra note 222, at 1700–01 (discussing how definitions that prohibit certain 
types of conduct are inflexible and may not cover bizarre punishments). 
259 See infra Parts IV.B–C (suggesting that the legislature should create a statute that 
requires courts to look at the totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether a 
parent’s conduct was reasonable based upon its necessity, proportionality, and the child 
and parent’s history and characteristics). 
260 See supra Part III.B (discussing the negative impact of corporal punishment on 
children). 
261 See supra Part III.C (discussing the financial and social costs to society resulting from 
child abuse). 
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others.262  One way to ensure that the defense is successful in such cases 
is to require necessity and proportionality, which are characteristic of 
other justification defenses.263 
The parental-discipline defense standards should explicitly require 
that the conduct be necessary and proportional.  Necessity should be 
shown by proof that alternative, non-physical parenting strategies were 
used prior to the physical assault and that those remedies were 
exhausted to no avail or that the immanency of danger created a 
situation where the opportunity to seek other recourse was not 
reasonable.264  Proportionality should require the parent to use an 
amount of force that is less harmful than the danger the child’s conduct 
creates.265 
C. A Proposed Statute 
A new statute should include (i) a prohibition against child abuse; 
(ii) a requirement that a parent’s use of physical force is necessary to 
prevent further harm to the child or others; and (iii) a requirement that a 
parent’s action is roughly proportional to the child’s misbehavior.266  
Thus, the new statute and its commentary should read as follows: 
In determining whether physical force is a lawful exercise of 
parental authority for the promotion of a child’s welfare, the 
court shall consider all relevant factors, including: 
(a) whether the act is child abuse, as codified in Indiana Code 
section 31-34-1-1;267 
(b) whether the actor is a parent; 
(c) the age, sex, and physical and mental condition of the 
child and parent; 
(d) the history of violence of the parent or child; 
(e) the nature and motive of the child’s and parent’s offense; 
(f) the influence of the child’s example upon other 
children of the same family or group; 
                                                 
262 See CHILD WELFARE MANUAL 4.18, supra note 206 (stating that one risk factor requiring 
the state to take custody of a child may be where the child might harm himself or others 
and needs protection). 
263 See ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 131(d). 
264 See supra Parts III.A.1–2 (analyzing the lack of necessity and proportionality standards 
that are characteristic of a justification defense in the Model Penal Code and Restatement 
(Second) of Torts approaches). 
265 See supra Parts III.A.1–2. 
266 See supra Parts IV.A–B (providing the reasons for including these factors). 
267 See supra Part IV.A (advocating amending the definition of child abuse). 
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(g) whether the force or confinement is necessary and 
appropriate to compel obedience to a proper command; 
(h) whether the force used is proportionate to the offense; 
(i) whether the force or confinement used is unnecessarily 
degrading or the force or confinement is likely to cause 
serious or permanent harm.268 
Commentary 
Several factors of this test have changed in order to protect children.  
First, the test requires that one consider whether the conduct is a 
prohibited form of abuse.269  Second, the factors require the fact-finder 
not only to consider the child’s history and characteristics, but also his or 
her parents’ history.270  Third, the factors incorporate language that puts 
the requirements of necessity and proportionality, as traditionally found 
in justification defenses, into the statute.271 
In order to further explain the revisions to the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts Section 150, the following commentary should also be included 
with the statute: 
Comment A.  An act which meets the definition of child abuse 
should be presumably unjustified.  It is up to the parent to 
rebut the presumption that the act was unjustified by 
asserting that the child’s conduct was leading to imminent 
danger or was likely to lead to imminent danger and that no 
lesser force could be used to curtail the child’s course of 
conduct.272 
Comment B.  In light of research about a parent’s history of 
violence and its impact on his or her parenting, the parent’s 
characteristics must also be considered. 273  A court may 
                                                 
268 The italics indicate content added by the author to the factors provided by 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 (1965). 
269 See supra Part IV.A (proposing the addition of a definition of child abuse). 
270 See supra Part IV.C (adding to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 parental 
factors). 
271 See supra Part IV.B (proposing reasons and ways in which the legislature may 
introduce necessity and proportionality standards into the law). 
272 See supra Part II.D (analyzing the negative impact of child abuse on children).  Also, 
this provision helps shift the burden of proof from the prosecutor to the parent, which 
eliminates a concern raised in the Willis dissenting opinion.  See Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 
177, 184 (Ind. 2008) (Sullivan, J., dissenting). 
273 See CHILD WELFARE MANUAL 4.18, supra note 206 (providing the safety assessment tool 
the Department of Child Services utilizes in assessments).  The assessment tools consider 
the parent’s predominant viewpoint of the child, history of violence, and prior involvement 
in a child abuse case.  Id. 
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consider a parent’s history of being an aggressor or the 
parent’s predominant viewpoint about the child.274  
Furthermore, a parent’s physical and mental health may 
impact his or her parenting.275  Thus, a court may consider 
these factors as aggravating circumstances or mitigating 
circumstances, depending on the parent’s conduct in the past. 
Comment C.  The child’s conduct must run a substantial 
likelihood of harm to self or others in order for a parent to gain 
protection for the use of physical discipline that leads to non-
accidental physical injury.276 
D. New Standards Benefit Society and its Children 
The proposed statute is beneficial to society and its children.  First, 
the proposed statute is helpful to society.  With a clear guideline 
prohibiting designated categories of physical injury, courts will be able 
to operate under a succinct definition of abuse.  Judges who have little 
experience with domestic violence will be more alert to the injuries 
considered the result of abuse.277  Furthermore, judges will have readily 
available parental risk factors that indicate child abuse, thus increasing 
the likelihood that judges will arrive at decisions predicated on 
information child abuse experts look at when assessing a situation.278  A 
criminal law court, guided by this statute, will more likely arrive at the 
same or similar conclusion as would a civil law court that adjudicates a 
child as a CHINS.279  This statute will increase judicial consistency and 
efficiency within family cases by reducing judicial discretion over what 
constitutes abuse. 
Second, and most importantly, the proposed statute is beneficial to 
children.  As previously mentioned, the statute may deter parents from 
engaging in abusive practices.280  By preventing parents from engaging 
in abusive acts, the statute helps maintain the parent-child bond.281  
Furthermore, the statute will reduce the confusion and anxiety a child 
feels towards the legal system for allowing his or her parent to abuse 
him or her while the child is punished by being placed in foster care or 
                                                 
274 Id. 
275 Id. 
276 See supra Part III.A (supporting the addition of a necessity requirement). 
277 See supra Part IV.A (defining child abuse injuries). 
278 See supra Part IV.C (incorporating parental risk factors into the Restatement’s 
language). 
279 See CHILD WELFARE MANUAL 4.18, supra note 206 (providing parental risk factors that 
the proposed statute adopts). 
280 See supra Part IV.D (discussing the impact this reform would have on parents). 
281 Straus, supra note 10, at 146. 
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another parent’s care.282  Finally, more parents who abuse their children 
will be prosecuted for their wrongful acts, thus decreasing the amount of 
violence against children. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The parental-discipline defense creates an excuse for violence.  There 
is a need for the Indiana legislature to re-evaluate this area of law 
because the current laws put children at risk and the Restatement 
standards do not provide the same criteria that the State’s risk and safety 
assessments look at when determining whether a parent’s acts or affinity 
for future acts are abusive.  The legislature needs to close the gap 
between these two systems in order to create a coherent system of laws 
that delicately balance the right to a raise a child and the child’s right to 
live free from abuse. 
A stronger approach to child protection would include creating a 
statutory definition of child abuse and incorporating it into a totality of 
the circumstances test.  Then children—like William—will understand 
that while their conduct was not right, neither was their parents’.  This is 
one step toward ending the cycle of domestic violence so characteristic of 
American culture.  Furthermore, parents will understand that abuse is 
not tolerated regardless of the reasoning behind it.  In the end, Indiana 
will be one step closer to protecting its children from abuse. 
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282 See supra Part II.B (discussing the negative impact of corporal punishment on a child’s 
well-being). 
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